

Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War

\$2 Billion Program Reversed Tide for Rebels

First of two articles

By Steve Coll
Washington Post Foreign Service

A specially equipped C-141 Starlifter transport carrying William Casey touched down at a military air base south of Islamabad in October 1984 for a secret visit by the CIA director to plan strategy for the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Helicopters lifted Casey to three secret training camps near the Afghan border, where he watched *mujaheddin* rebels fire heavy weapons and learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic explosives and detonators.

During the visit, Casey started his Pakistani hosts by proposing that they take the Afghan war into enemy territory—into the Soviet Union itself. Casey wanted to ship subversive propaganda through Afghanistan to the Soviet Union's predominantly Muslim southern republics. The Pakistanis agreed, and the CIA soon supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on Soviet atrocities in Uzbekistan and tracts on historical heroes of Uzbek nationalism, according to Pakistani and Western officials.

"We can do a lot of damage to the Soviet Union," Casey said, according to Mohammed Yousef, a Pakistani general who attended the meeting.

Casey's visit was a prelude to a secret Reagan administration decision in March 1985, reflected in National Security Decision Directive 166, to sharply escalate U.S. covert action in Afghanistan, according to Western officials. Abandoning a policy of simple harassment of Soviet occupiers, the Reagan team decided secretly to let loose on the Afghan battlefield an array of U.S. high technology and military expertise in an effort to hit and demoralize Soviet commanders and soldiers. Casey saw it as a prime opportunity to strike at an overextended, potentially vulnerable Soviet empire.

Eight years after Casey's visit to Pakistan, the Soviet Union is no more. Afghanistan has fallen to the heavily armed, fratricidal *mujaheddin* rebels. The Afghans themselves did the fighting and dying—and ul-

timately won their war against the Soviets—and not all of them lead the CIA's role in their victory. But even some sharp critics of the CIA agree that in military terms, its secret 1985 escalation of covert support to the *mujaheddin* made a major difference in Afghanistan, the last battlefield of the long Cold War.

How the Reagan administration decided to go for victory in the Afghan war between 1984 and 1988 has been shrouded in secrecy and clouded by the sharply divergent political agendas of those involved. But with the triumph of the *mujaheddin* rebels over Afghanistan's leftist government in April and the demise of the Soviet Union, some intelligence officials involved have decided to reveal how the covert escalation was carried out.

The most prominent of these former intelligence officers is Yousef, the Pakistani general who supervised the covert war between 1983 and 1987 and who last month published in Europe and Pakistan a detailed account of his role and that of the CIA, titled "The Bear Trap."

This article and another to follow are based on extensive interviews with Yousef as well as with more than a dozen senior Western officials who confirmed Yousef's disclosures and elaborated on them.

U.S. officials worried about what might happen if aspects of their stepped-up covert action were exposed—or if the program succeeded too well and provoked the Soviets to react in hot anger. The escalation that began in 1985 "was directed at killing Russian military officers," one Western official said. "That caused a bit of nervousness."

One source of jitters was that Pakistani intelligence officers—partly inspired by Casey—began independently to train Afghans and funnel CIA supplies for scattered strikes against military installations, factories and storage depots within Soviet territory.

The attacks later alarmed U.S. officials in Washington, who saw military raids on Soviet territory as "an incredible escalation," according to Graham Fuller, then a senior U.S. intelligence official who counseled against any such raids. Fearing a large-scale Soviet response and the fallout of such attacks on U.S.-Soviet diplomacy, the Reagan administration blocked the transfer to Pakistan of detailed satellite photographs of military targets inside the Soviet Union, other U.S. officials said.

To Yousef, who managed the Koran-smuggling program and the guerrilla raids inside Soviet territory, the United States ultimately "chickened out" on the question of taking the secret Afghan war onto Soviet soil. Nonetheless, Yousef recalled, Casey was "ruthless in his approach, and he had a built-in hatred for the Soviets."

An intelligence coup in 1984 and 1985 triggered the Reagan administration's decision to escalate the covert program in Afghanistan, according to Western officials. The United States received highly specific, sensitive information about Kremlin politics and new Soviet war plans in Afghanistan. Already under pressure from Congress and conservative activists to expand its support to the *mujaheddin*, the Reagan administration moved in response to this intelligence to open up its high-technology arsenal to aid the Afghan rebels.

Beginning in 1985, the CIA supplied *mujaheddin* rebels with extensive satellite reconnaissance data of Soviet targets on the Afghan battlefield, plans for military operations based on the satellite intelligence, intercepts of Soviet communications, secret communications networks for the rebels, delayed timing devices for tons of C-4 plastic explosives for urban sabotage and sophisticated guerrilla attacks, long-range sniper rifles, a targeting device for mortars that was linked to a U.S. Navy satellite, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and other equipment.

The move to upgrade aid to the *mujaheddin* roughly coincided with the well-known decision in 1986 to provide the *mujaheddin* with sophisticated, U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles. Before the missiles arrived, however, those involved in the covert war wrestled with a wide-ranging and at times divisive debate over how far they should go in challenging the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Roots of the Rebellion

In 1980, not long after Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan to prop up a sympathetic leftist government, President Jimmy Carter signed the first—and for many years the only—presidential "finding" on Afghanistan, the classified directive required by U.S. law to begin covert operations, according to several Western sources familiar with the Carter document.

The Carter finding sought to aid Afghan rebels in "harassment" of Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan through secret supplies of light weapons and other assistance. The finding did not talk of driving Soviet forces out of Afghanistan or defeating them militarily, goals few considered possible at the time, these sources said.

The cornerstone of the program was that the United States, through the CIA, would provide funds, some weapons and general supervision of support for the *mujaheddin* rebels, but day-to-day operations and direct contact with the *mujaheddin* would be left to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI. The hands-off U.S. role contrasted with CIA operations in Nicaragua and Angola.

Saudi Arabia agreed to match U.S. financial contributions to the *mujaheddin* and distributed funds directly to ISI. China sold weapons to the CIA and donated a smaller number directly to Pakistan, but the extent of China's role has been one of the secret war's most closely guarded secrets.

In all, the United States funneled more than \$2 billion in guns and money to the *mujaheddin* during the 1980s, according to U.S. officials. It was the largest covert action program since World War II.

In the first years after the Reagan administration inherited the Carter program, the covert Afghan war "tended to be handled out of Casey's back pocket," recalled Ronald Spiers, a former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, the base of the Afghan rebels. Mainly from China's government, the CIA purchased assault rifles, grenade launchers, mines and SA-7 light antiaircraft weapons, and then arranged for shipment to Pakistan. Most of the weapons dated to the Korean War or earlier. The amounts were significant—10,000 tons of arms and ammunition in 1983, according to Yousef—but a fraction of what they would be in just a few years.

Beginning in 1984, Soviet forces in Afghanistan began to experiment with new and more aggressive tactics against the *mujaheddin*, based on the use of Soviet special forces, called the Spetsnaz, in helicopter-borne assaults on Afghan rebel supply lines. As these tactics succeeded, Soviet commanders pursued them, increasingly, to the point where some U.S. congressmen who traveled with the *mujaheddin*—including Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Tex.) and Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-

N.H.)—believed that the war might turn against the rebels.

The new Soviet tactics reflected a perception in the Kremlin that the Red Army was in danger of becoming bogged down in Afghanistan and needed to take decisive steps to win the war, according to sensitive intelligence that reached the Reagan administration in 1984 and 1985, Western officials said. The intelligence came from the upper reaches of the Soviet Defense Ministry and indicated that Soviet hard-liners were pushing a plan to attempt to win the Afghan war within two years, sources said.

The new war plan was to be implemented by Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev, who was transferred from the prestigious command of Soviet forces in Germany to run the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the spring of 1985, just as Mikhail Gorbachev was battling hard-line rivals to take power in a Kremlin succession struggle.

Cracking the Kremlin's Strategy

The intelligence about Soviet war plans in Afghanistan was highly specific, according to Western sources. The Soviets intended to deploy one-third of their total Spetsnaz forces in Afghanistan—nearly 2,000 "highly trained and motivated" paratroops, according to Yousaf. In addition, the Soviets intended to dispatch a stronger KGB presence to assist the special forces and regular troops, and they intended to deploy some of the Soviet Union's most sophisticated battlefield communications equipment, referred to by some as the "Omsk vans"—mobile, integrated communications centers that would permit interception of mujaheddin battlefield communications and rapid, coordinated aerial attacks on rebel targets, such as the kind that were demoralizing the rebels by 1984.

At the Pentagon, U.S. military officers pored over the intelligence, considering plans to thwart the Soviet escalation, officials said. The answers they came up with, said a Western official, were to provide "secure communications [for the Afghan rebels], kill the gunships and the fighter cover, better routes for [mujaheddin] infiltration, and get to work on [Soviet] targets" in Afghanistan, including the Omsk vans, through the use of satellite reconnaissance and increased, specialized guerrilla training.

"There was a demand from my friends [in the CIA] to capture a vehicle intact with this sort of communications," recalled Yousaf, referring to the newly introduced mobile Soviet facilities. Unfortunately, despite much effort, Yousaf said, "we never succeeded in that."

"Spetsnaz was key," said Vincent Cannistraro, a CIA operations officer who was posted at the time as director of intelligence programs at the National Security Council. Not only did communications improve, but the Spetsnaz forces were willing to fight aggressively and at night. The problem, Cannistraro said, was that as the Soviets moved to escalate, the U.S. aid was "just enough to get a very brave people killed" because it encouraged the mujaheddin to fight but did not provide them with the means to win.

Conservatives in the Reagan administration and especially in Congress saw the CIA as part of the problem. Humphrey, the former senator and a leading conservative supporter of the mujaheddin, found the CIA "really, really reluctant" to increase the quality of support for the Afghan rebels to meet Soviet escalation. For their part, CIA officers felt the war was not going as badly as some skeptics thought, and they worried that it might not be possible to preserve secrecy in the midst of a major escalation. A sympathetic U.S. official said the agency's key decision-makers "did not question the wisdom" of the escalation, but were "simply careful."

In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166, and national security adviser Robert D. McFarlane signed an extensive annex, augmenting the original Carter intelligence finding that focused on "harassment" of Soviet occupying



WILLIAM CASEY
CIA director
'We can do a lot of damage to the Soviet Union.'



ORRIN G. HATCH
Republican senator, Utah
Secretly visited China to enlist help for Afghan rebels.

forces, according to several sources. Although it covered diplomatic and humanitarian objectives as well, the new, detailed Reagan directive used bold language to authorize stepped-up covert military aid to the mujaheddin, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a new goal: to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action and encourage a Soviet withdrawal.

New Covert U.S. Aid

The new covert U.S. assistance began with a dramatic increase in arms supplies—a steady rise to 65,000 tons annually by 1987, according to Yousaf—as well as what he called a "ceaseless stream" of CIA and Pentagon specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan's ISI on the main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

There the CIA specialists met with Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations for the Afghan rebels. At any one time during the Afghan fighting season, as many as 11 ISI teams trained and supplied by the CIA accompanied the mujaheddin across the border to supervise attacks, according to Yousaf and Western sources. The teams attacked airports, railroads, fuel depots, electricity pylons, bridges and roads, the sources said.

CIA and Pentagon specialists offered detailed satellite photographs and ink maps of Soviet targets around Afghanistan. The CIA station chief in Islamabad ferried U.S. intercepts of Soviet battlefield communications.

Other CIA specialists and military officers supplied secure communications gear and trained Pakistani instructors on how to use it. Experts on psychological warfare brought propaganda and books. Demolitions experts gave instructions on the explosives needed to destroy key targets such as bridges, tunnels and fuel depots. They also supplied chemical and electronic timing devices and remote control switches for delayed bombs and rockets that could be shot without a mujaheddin rebel present at the firing site.

The new efforts focused on strategic targets such as the Termez Bridge between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. "We got the information like current speed of the water, current depth of the water, the width of the pillars, which would be the best way to demolish," Yousaf said. In Washington, CIA lawyers debated whether it was legal to blow up pylons on the Soviet side of the bridge as opposed to the Afghan side, keeping with the decision not to support military action across the Soviet border, a Western official said.

Despite several attempts, Afghan rebels trained in the new program never brought the Termez Bridge down, though they did damage and destroy other targets, such as pipelines and depots, in the sensitive border area, Western and Pakistani sources said.

The most valuable intelligence provided by the Americans was the satellite reconnaissance, Yousaf said. Soon the wall of Yousaf's office was covered with detailed maps of Soviet targets in Afghanistan such as airfields, armories and military buildings. The maps came with CIA assessments of how best to approach the target, possible routes of withdrawal, and analysis of how Soviet troops might respond to an attack. "They would say there are the vehicles, and there is the [river bank], and there is the tank," Yousaf said.

CIA operations officers helped Pakistani trainers establish schools for the mujaheddin in secure communications, guerrilla warfare, urban sabotage and heavy weapons, Yousaf and Western officials said.

The first anti-aircraft systems used by the mujaheddin were the Swiss-made Oerlikon heavy gun and the British-made Blowpipe missile, according to Yousaf and Western sources. When these proved ineffective, the United States sent the Stinger. Pakistani officers traveled to the United States for training on the Stinger in June 1986 and then set up a secret mujaheddin Stinger training facility in Rawalpindi, complete with an elec-



MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
Soviet president
Afghanistan defeat may have helped him by hurting Kremlin hardliners



MIKHAIL ZAITSEV
Soviet general
Put in charge of Soviet war in Afghanistan in the spring of 1985

tronic simulator made in the United States. The ulator allowed mujaheddin trainees to aim and large screen without actually shooting off expensive missiles, Yousof said. The screen marked the missile's track and calculated whether the trainee would have hit his airborne target.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of such training and battlefield intelligence depended on the mujaheddin themselves; their performance and willingness to employ disciplined tactics varied greatly. Yousof considered the aid highly valuable, although persistently marred by supplies of weapons such as the Blowpipe that failed miserably on the battlefield.

At the least, the escalation on the U.S. side initiated with Reagan's 1985 National Security Directive helped to change the character of the Afghan war, intensifying the struggle and raising the stakes for both sides. It also changed led U.S. officials to confront a difficult that had legal, military, foreign policy and implications: In taking the Afghan covert more directly to the Soviet enemy, how far the United States be prepared to go?

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intended to supply the sniper rifles to Afghan rebels so they could infiltrate Afghanistan's capital of Kabul and kill senior Soviet generals stationed there, Western sources said.

If Washington chose to assist the plan, there was reason to believe it might succeed. In response to National Security Decision Directive 166, signed by President Reagan in March 1985, the Reagan administration had sharply escalated its covert operations in Afghanistan, in part by stepping up satellite reconnaissance and other intelligence collection on the Afghan battlefield. The U.S. intelligence pinpointed the residences of leading Soviet generals in Kabul and regularly tracked their movements, as well as those of visiting commanders from Moscow and Tashkent, officials said.


The sniper-rifle request posed a delicate issue for the Reagan administration: How far was it prepared to go in trying to defeat the

CIA officers or administration officials in jail because killing Soviet generals could be seen as violating the 1977 presidential directive against CIA involvement in assassinations, U.S. officials said.

If the CIA station chief provided the rifles "with the intent" to kill specific Soviet generals then "he will go to jail," an official said administration lawyers argued during this legal debate. The question then arose, "How about if he does it without knowing what they're going to be used for?" But CIA lawyers responded that it was "too late" because the plan to kill specific Soviet generals had been consigned to writing in CIA cables between Washington and Pakistan.

To some involved in the debate, such as Vincent Cannistraro, a CIA operations officer then posted as an intelligence official on the National Security Council staff, shooting Soviet generals in Kabul did not seem much different from encouraging mujaheddin rebels to kill Soviet officers in helicopters with antiaircraft missiles. Assassination "is really not a relevant question in a wartime scenario," Cannistraro said in an interview.

CIA officers in Afghan garb stood with rebels as covert arms shipment was trucked to Afghan border post in 1984



BY JAMES BURELL—THE WASHINGTON POST

In CIA's Covert Afghan War, Where to Draw the Line Was Key

Last of two articles

By Steve Coll

Washington Post Foreign Service

As part of the CIA's annual "shopping list" exercise in which Pakistan's intelligence service ordered guns and ammunition from the agency for use by Afghan mujaheddin rebels, the CIA station chief in Islamabad in 1985 transmitted to his superiors an unusual request: The Pakistanis wanted "packages" of long-range sniper rifles and sophisticated sighting scopes.

When the request circulated among members of the Reagan administration team that was supervising the covert Afghan program, U.S. intelligence officials said the Pakistanis

Soviet Union in Afghanistan? Pressed by conservative activists, the administration had decided to expand its earlier policy of covert "harassment" of Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan by directly challenging the Soviet military command—a change they hoped would win the war. At a time of high tension in U.S.-Soviet relations, the United States had opened its high-technology military and intelligence arsenal to help the mujaheddin confront Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Yet the question of which tools might be seen as too provocative—by either the Soviets or U.S. critics—was continually a sensitive one.

Among other things, those involved had lawyers looking over their shoulders. CIA and administration attorneys feared that targeting the Soviet military command might land

One problem was the presidential "finding" or classified legal authorization for the U.S. covert program in Afghanistan, which dated to the Carter administration and described the purpose of U.S. aid as the "harassment" of Soviet forces. Although the Carter finding had been augmented by Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 166, the language in the original finding remained a key legal basis of the covert program.

"We came down to, is 'harassment' assassination of Soviet generals?" said an official.

"The phrase 'shooting ducks in a barrel' was used," another official recalled of the discussions. Those who favored providing the sniper packages "thought there was

no better way to carry out harassment than to "off" Russian generals in series," an idea that would be "unthinkable" to the U.S. State Department and to other Reagan administration officials.

Ultimately, a decision was made to provide the sniper rifles requested by the Pakistanis—but without night vision goggles or intelligence information that would permit effective assassination of Soviet generals in Kabul, officials said. Mohammed Yousaf, a Pakistani general who supervised covert aid between 1983 and 1987, recalled in an interview receiving more than 30 but fewer than 100 sniper rifles. With CIA assistance, Pakistan—which felt threatened by Moscow's control of neighboring Afghanistan and was eager to cooperate with the United States in opposing the Soviet occupation—held a two-day training course to teach mujaheddin rebels how to use the rifles against "military targets," including what a U.S. official said were "trucks and armored personnel carriers."

Urban Sabotage

A similar issue concerned urban sabotage.

During the mid-1980s, the CIA aided Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) in establishing and supplying two secret mujaheddin training schools in guerrilla warfare, including one that concentrated on urban sabotage techniques, according to Yousaf. Pakistan instructors trained by the CIA taught Afghans how to build and conceal bombs with C-4 plastic explosives and what Yousaf estimated were more than 1,000 chemical and electronic-delay bomb timers supplied by the CIA. The principal idea was to carry out attacks against military targets such as fuel and ammunition depots, pipelines, tunnels and bridges, Yousaf and Western sources said.

Some mujaheddin trained at the CIA-assisted guerrilla schools used the materials and training supplied to carry out a number of car bombings and other assassination attacks in Kabul under ISI direction, according to Yousaf. By his account, a graduate of the urban sabotage school nearly blew up future Afghan president Najibullah in downtown Kabul in late 1985, when Najibullah was chief of the hated Afghan secret police.

"We made numerous attempts to kill Najibullah," Yousaf wrote in a recently published memoir of the secret war titled "The Bear Trap."

Yousaf said that dominant in his mind was the view that "Kabul is the center of gravity" in Afghanistan and that it was essential that Soviet occupiers "should not feel safe anywhere." At the same time, he said, no attacks on civilian targets were deliberately planned by Pakistan, the CIA or the mujaheddin.

Western officials said they did not sanction car-bomb or similar attacks but that they could not control the use of bombs and weapons they had supplied. "The reality is that you don't know what the people are going to do with the weapons you give them, whether [delay detonators] or AK-47s or whatever," said a U.S. official. "We did as best we could to be sure the weapons and training supplied

were directed to military targets, broadly defined."

The CIA exercised relatively little control over specific mujaheddin attacks, because the agency ceded operational responsibility to the Pakistanis. This was an enduring feature of the covert program's basic structure. The United States supplied funds, weapons and general supervision. Saudi Arabia matched U.S. financial contributions, and China's government sold and donated weapons. But the dominant operational role on the front lines belonged to Pakistan's ISI, which insisted on control.

For most of the war, no Americans trained mujaheddin directly—instead, the CIA trained Pakistani instructors. Particularly during the post-1985 escalation, CIA officers lobbied their Pakistani counterparts to carry out certain kinds of guerrilla operations and to permit greater U.S. involvement, Yousaf and Western sources said. But the ISI resisted such requests, and decision-making rested ultimately with the Pakistanis and the Afghans.

"The CIA believed they had to handle this as if they were wearing a condom," said Cannistraro, who advocated more direct involvement.

Within the U.S. government, the post-1985 escalation was supervised by an interagency committee chaired by a member of Reagan's NSC staff that included representatives from the Pentagon, State Department and CIA. Early in 1987, some officials within the Reagan administration pushed for a transfer of the Afghan covert program from the CIA to the Pentagon, where Special Forces and other paramilitary specialists sought greater involvement with the mujaheddin. This proposal was rejected by national security adviser Frank Carlucci and his deputy, Gen. Colin Powell, after a vigorous debate, Western officials said.

The Chinese Connection

To thwart Soviet military escalation in Afghanistan during the mid-1980s, conservative supporters of the mujaheddin, particularly those in Congress, believed they faced two major challenges. They felt the Afghan rebels urgently needed an effective weapon to destroy aircraft and helicopter gunships used by Soviet special forces. And they wanted to harass and destroy strategic targets in Afghanistan dear to the Soviet military command.

In January 1986, these twin goals brought Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to China.

Flanked by two senior CIA operations officers whom he suspected had been sent to "watch over me," Hatch sat with China's intelligence chief in a Beijing office. That Hatch, an ardent conservative and anti-communist, found himself cajoling one of the world's most important communist spy masters reflected the way the Afghan covert program tended to produce strange bedfellows. The meeting also highlighted China's influential role in the CIA's Afghan operations.

From the beginning, China provided a key link in the covert logistics pipeline through which arms and ammunition reached the Afghan rebels based in Pakistan, according to Pakistani and U.S. sources. Frightened of Soviet expansion-

ism, the Chinese privately encouraged the United States to take on the Soviet army in Afghanistan, and Chinese intelligence officials offered extensive assistance.

During the early years of the covert Afghan program, the CIA purchased the bulk of the weapons earmarked for the mujaheddin from the Beijing government and arranged for their shipping to the Pakistani port of Karachi, Yousaf and Western sources said. Later, the CIA further diversified its purchases and bought many weapons from Egypt, in part to save money, U.S. sources said.

A U.S. official involved estimated that by the mid-1980s the Beijing government earned \$100 million annually in weapons sales to the CIA. "The Chinese were supportive and were also making money—a considerable amount of money," he said. Yousaf said the Chinese typically donated about 10 percent to 15 percent of the weapons and ammunition sold annually to the CIA, although the CIA had to pay for shipping these materials to Karachi. To protect secrecy, the weapons typically were copies of Soviet ones, although some of those delivered had Chinese markings.

Hatch traveled to Beijing because he wanted Chinese support for more than just weapons supplies. The senator was accompanied by some of the key officials who helped manage the covert Afghan program, including Morton Abramowitz, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Cannistraro from the NSC staff; Michael Pillsbury, assistant to the defense undersecretary for policy planning; Fred Ikle, the CIA station chief in Beijing; and the deputy chief of the CIA's operations directorate.



In 1985, rebels readied Chinese-made weapons: an 82mm mortar

BY JAMES RUPERT—THE WASHINGTON POST

In consultation with these intelligence officials, Hatch urged the Chinese to support the escalation of U.S. covert aid now underway, particularly the new efforts to hit key targets with sophisticated guerrilla strikes. U.S. demolition experts equipped with detailed satellite intelligence were helping the Pakistanis plan operations against these targets, sometimes with Pakistan intelligence officers accompanying Afghan rebels on the raids. But Hatch wanted Chinese support as well, the senator recalled in an interview. The Chinese intelligence chief agreed, according to Hatch and other sources.

Hatch then asked the Chinese official if he would agree to support the supply of U.S.-made Stinger missiles to the Afghan rebels, and if he would communicate his support directly to Pakistani President Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq as part of a coordinated lobbying effort. Although supplying Stingers would mark a departure from U.S. policy not to provide weapons that could be traced directly to the CIA, Hatch and others believed the missiles were needed desperately by the mujaheddin. Other anti-aircraft weapons—including surface-to-air missiles sold in large quantities to the CIA by the Chinese government—had been tried and had failed. Pressed by Hatch and aware that the senator was surrounded by representatives of the entire U.S. intelligence apparatus, the Chinese intelligence chief agreed to the Stinger request, Hatch and others said.

Hatch's party then flew to Pakistan and made the same pitch to Zia, who agreed for the first time to accept the Stingers. Six months later, after a lengthy internal Reagan administration fight that pitted a reluctant CIA and U.S. Army against bullish Pentagon and State intelligence officials, the Stinger supply program began. In retrospect, many senior U.S. officials involved see the decision as a turning point in the war and acknowledge that Hatch's clandestine lobbying played a significant role.

The Stingers proved effective against the Soviet helicopter gunships used by the Spetsnaz special forces. Yousaf said the supply agreement called for the United States to send about 250 "grip stocks" or launchers annually, along with slightly more than 1,000 missiles. Estimates of the mujaheddin success rate in firing the heat-seeking missiles vary widely from about 30 percent to 75 percent. Western officials said, but in any case, many on the U.S. side believe the missiles helped encourage the Soviets to "abandon the doctrine they thought would win the war," as one official put it.

Logistical Controversies

Throughout the Afghan war, critics of the CIA's covert operations voiced two major complaints: that large amounts of weapons and money earmarked for the mujaheddin were being stolen, and that CIA reliance on Pakistani intermediaries funneled too many resources were being funneled to Islamic fundamentalist elements in the Afghan resistance. Much remains unclear about these two contro-

versial questions, but some new information has come to light.

Secrecy shrouded the logistics pipeline. Purchases of weapons from China, Egypt and even communist Poland generally were made or coordinated by CIA logistics officers in Washington, Yousaf and Western sources said. Many of the deals, particularly with China, were handled at a government-to-government level through intelligence liaisons, but others were routed through the private arms market, sources said.

When a ship laden with weapons was about to arrive in Karachi, the CIA station in Islamabad informed Yousaf of the details and then Pakistani intelligence agents arranged for unloading and shipment by rail and truck to the Afghan border, Yousaf and Western sources said. Sometimes the Chinese military attaché in Pakistan was present in Karachi to monitor the process, and the Chinese generally demanded strict accounting, Yousaf said. The CIA station in Islamabad received paper receipts for ultimate deliveries to the mujaheddin. At first the receipts were provided annually, then semi-annually and later quarterly as CIA demands for more accountability increased.

The Pakistanis continually complained about the quality of weapons received. Early anti-aircraft systems such as the Oerlikon and Blowpipe were highly ineffective, both sides agree. Egyptian supplies of World War II-vintage weapons often arrived with empty boxes and unusable ammunition, Yousaf said. "We were in a business we had never been in before at that scale," said a U.S. official. "We were in a learning situation. There were mistakes made, [but] the quality evened out and in fact improved over the course of the war."

There were incidents of obvious corruption. Yousaf recounts one from 1983 when a Karachi arms merchant bought hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for .303 rifles from Pakistan's military ordnance factory—then controlled by Zia's martial-law regime—and sold them to the CIA.


The ammunition was loaded onto a boat in Karachi, which then steamed into the Arabian Sea, turned around and returned to Karachi, at which point the CIA informed Pakistan's intelligence service that a shipment of bullets had arrived. When Pakistani logistics officers, unaware of the transaction, opened the boxes, they found the bullets all had the initials "POF"—for the Pakistan Ordnance Factory—stamped on them. To maintain secrecy, the bullets all had to be defaced at CIA expense, Yousaf said, adding that he personally handled accounting of the defacement payments from the CIA. U.S. officials said they could not recall the incident.

U.S. officials contended that under pressure from Congress, they continually investigated charges of corruption and found little evidence to support them. "I'm positive there are some people who have grown rich or at least wealthier on this," said a U.S. official, but "we have no hard evidence and we did look." For his part,

Yousaf said corruption in the program was minimal.

Both Pakistani and Western sources agree fundamentalist parties in the Afghan resistance received the lion's share of weapons, but they dispute charges made by some in the U.S. Congress that one ambitious fundamentalist leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, received up to 50 percent of the guns and money. Yousaf said that when he left his job in 1987, Hekmatyar received about 18 percent to 20 percent of the annual allocation, and that all four Afghan fundamentalist parties combined received about 75 percent, leaving relatively small amounts for the three moderate parties. Hamid Gul, one of Yousaf's successors at ISI, described a similar percentage for Hekmatyar.

U.S. and European sources said these numbers are accurate, although they said Hekmatyar's weapons tended to be of much higher quality than his rivals', in part because his forces showed they could use the high-tech weapons and communications supplied by the CIA in large numbers beginning in 1985.



COURTESY LEO COOPER, LONDON

Pakistani point man:
A book by Pakistani Gen. Mohammed Yousaf details the covert U.S. war effort.

A Mixed Victory?

In February 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. At CIA headquarters in Langley, operations officers and analysts drank champagne.

Today, some involved in the Afghan program say they believe the Soviet defeat was one of several decisive factors that helped discredit Soviet hard-liners and encourage Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. And there is little doubt that defeat in Afghanistan had a profound impact on Soviet society in the late 1980s, as the Soviet empire unraveled.

After the Soviet withdrawal, the covert operation in Afghanistan was marked by heightened bickering, as diplomats increasingly usurped the role of the intelligence agencies. In Washington, CIA and State Department officials battled over whether to pursue a military victory over the leftist Kabul government or make peace. That debate ended last September with a U.S.-Soviet agreement to cut off all arms to warring Afghan factions. When the deal was implemented on Jan. 1, the

U.S. covert program in Afghanistan effectively ended.

To some who managed the Afghan program, the violent factionalism that accompanied the mujaheddin victory in April suggested that the CIA had done too little to promote political success for the Afghans as well as a military victory. To many in Pakistan, U.S. abandonment of the alliance seemed final evidence of a ruthless, fickle America that never cared very much about anything other than turning back the Soviet tide in central Asia.

But even Pakistani critics such as Yousaf acknowledge that without the U.S. covert program, the result in Afghanistan probably would have been much different. Although Yousaf and other Pakistani intelligence officials accuse the CIA of conspiring to undermine the Afghan holy war after Soviet troops withdrew, many also contend, in Yousaf's words, that "without the intelligence provided by the CIA, many battles would have been lost, and without the CIA training of our Pakistani instructors, the mujaheddin would have been fearfully ill-equipped to face—and ultimately defeat—a superpower."

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AFGHANISTAN Fear of Fundamentalism

JULY/AUGUST 1992

Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas overran Kabul in April, ending 14 years of war against the former Soviet-backed regime—but for Afghan women, the future looks anything but peaceful.

Destitute women and children make up 75 percent of the 8 million Afghans displaced by the fighting, some of whom are now returning from years in fundamentalist-controlled refugee camps in Pakistan (see *Ms.*, September/October 1990). "Clearly women and children suffered disproportionately from the war," said Sima Wali, an Afghan woman who heads the Washington, D.C.-based, Refugee Women in Develop-

ment. "And now these fundamentalists are waging a war on women." In the camps in Pakistan, some fundamentalists reportedly threatened to kill women seen not wearing veils. On state-run television in May, the religious affairs minister (sporting a pistol) told women that they can go to jobs or school only if they wear head scarves, gloves, and long skirts.

"They're trampling on our rights. What age and time do they think we are living in?" said one Kabul University student to a reporter from National Public Radio (U.S.). "Next they will want to keep us from working. I am afraid—very afraid."

Najibullah's precipitous departure creates crisis

Afghan rivals position themselves on either end of Kabul, the final prize

By PAUL OVERBY

It's high noon in Afghanistan. With the communists finally out of the way, there's a showdown coming between the two main wings of the rebels who fought them for so long.

On one side of town are the Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group for 2½ centuries, and on the other a coalition of minorities.

We can even find a good guy and a bad guy. The bad guy is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He will be gunning for Ahmed Shah Masood.

So far Masood has managed to prevent the conflict. He is, according to latest reports, trying to set up a council of commanders around Kabul that would take over the city jointly and perhaps form the core of a transitional government. All of the seven main rebel parties are supposed to have given their commanders approval to participate in this council, except one — Hekmatyar's party.

I spent time with both sides when I was in Afghanistan and heard even more about them. The results of the shootout, if it comes, could have a long-range impact on the United States.

Hekmatyar is a hard-core fundamentalist who would probably love to link up with like-minded radicals elsewhere in the Muslim world and make all kinds of trouble for the United States and The West generally.

Hekmatyar has the reputation for running a tight organization, and a harsh one. When I spent 2½ months with a group of his guerrillas, the commander even had stationery printed with the party name. And he beat one of his mujahideen for smoking cigarettes. In the summer of 1989, one of his commanders ambushed a large party of commanders associated with Masood and executed several of them.

Masood, on the other hand, seems almost too good to be true: a reasonable man who has looked after his people and sought consensus rather than overlordship. Masood belongs to the Jamiat party. After meeting extensively with Jamiat people in Peshawar, the exile headquarters of the rebels, I calculated that the party lay about in the middle of the resistance political spectrum. Of course, it has to be understood that this was a spectrum made up of various sorts of fundamentalists.

The rebels are not spun-sugar angels; these are hard men who kept fighting even after losing hundreds of thousands of women and children. They are not inclined to compromise.

The situation is in the balance: Hard-bitten warriors are now circling around the final prize of a 13-year war, the capital, Kabul. Chaos is imminent. This is the chaos that U.N. negotiator Benon Sevan was working against the clock to prevent.

Sevan had gone to Kabul to persuade communist President Najibullah to step down; what he couldn't have counted on was that Najibullah would act on this suggestion so soon and that the government would thereupon collapse.

What toppled the tough and wily Najibullah — who had survived for three years after the departure of his Soviet patrons — were

the disastrous living conditions in the cities, and particularly in Kabul.

While his troops may have had enough weapons and ammunition, there was, if not outright starvation, at least the real threat of the worst kind of cold and hunger for the soldiers' families. The enormous problem of supplying Kabul from nonexistent stores in the former Soviet Union finally caught up with Najibullah.

Then in March the most important city in the north slipped out of government control. In what could well have been a preview of the conflict to come, Najibullah had tried to force a Pashtun general on the Turkic militia. They rebelled and apparently struck a deal with the rebels who surrounded the city.

Whether Najibullah finally escapes or is executed by the guerrillas — and many moderate mujahideen would certainly execute him — doesn't affect the larger questions of who will claim power and how peace will be achieved. If Masood does succeed in, somehow reconciling with all the other commanders, it will be an act similar to divine intervention. The chances for continued fighting are, unfortunately, much greater.

Reports that speak of the war weariness of the Afghans and their eagerness for any sort of peace ignore other, grimmer realities. True, the country has been at war for 13 years, but that can also mean that there are big scores to settle.

In society where the warrior code of honor is a reality, the world view is different. Honor, which is the cardinal virtue, must be defended and often can only be verified when it is challenged; honor is created in battle. Where honor is uppermost, violence is inevitable.

And where honor is not the point of conflict, ethnic distrust will serve. The dominant Pashtuns are not used to minorities who for the first time in generations refuse to sit in the back of the bus. The largest-minority group, and as such the center of anti-Pashtun sentiment, are the Tajiks. It is significant that Masood is a Tajik.

The real leader on the Pashtun side has not emerged. For all his darkly interesting diabolical qualities, Hekmatyar, a Pashtun, will probably not be the leader of the Pashtuns. He is widely disliked even by other fundamentalists, not to speak of moderates and liberals.

Whoever the Pashtun leader turns out to be, he must offer a generous deal to the minorities or Afghanistan as a whole is in danger of breaking up as the northern minorities look for happier unions with their cousins in Central Asia.

Paul Overby of Southeast Portland lived with the Afghan mujahideen during part of 1988. He is negotiating publication of a book on the experience, "Holy Blood."

The Oregonian 4/24/92

به زور کلي نه بکريه

"Community is not created by force."

Collapse of Pakistan's Afghan policy

Kabul has been turned into a rubble. It survived a series of coups and ten years of Soviet military intervention. But it could not survive a few weeks of Islamic government by a coalition of mujahideen. And in his bid for the capital, Gulbadin Hekmatyar has trampled the Peshawar Accord, which Pakistan considered a supreme achievement of its foreign policy.

The threat to Pakistan's vital interests, posed by the fresh wave of civil war in Afghanistan, is so obvious that even the government in Islamabad seems worried. Much too worried, indeed, to produce rational responses.

The present fighting could produce one of the several possible results. Hekmatyar's objective is clear. He wants to capture power for himself and his favourite factions for the exclusion of the Uzbeks, the Shias, the royalists and what he brands as communists and Najibullah's collaborators.

If for any reason, problems on the ground or foreign pressures, Hekmatyar fails to take Kabul now, a truce may be possible. But the lull in hostilities will last only so long as it takes him to prepare for a new offensive. Thus, Afghanistan looks like condemned to the costliest fratricide in its history. The civil war could drag on for years and possibly for decades, because his opponents have a valid reason to resist him in their areas of control and interest, even if he does succeed in establishing his control over Kabul and the Pakhtun belt. In the event of a stalemate, Afghanistan could be divided into two, possibly three, feuding principalities.

This scenario is pregnant with a serious threat to Pakistan. Do what it may, Pakistan will be identified with the Hekmatyar faction. The faction fighting it, whether in an environment of anarchy such as prevalent at the moment or of hostility among the *de facto* authorities, will view Islamabad in the enemy role. Pakistan could lose the goodwill of a substantial section of the Afghan population, which is concentrated in strategically located pockets.

The Uzbeks and the Shias

may be forced to seek external support, the former from the north (Central Asia) and the latter from the west (Iran). This will inevitably strain Pakistan's relations with the Central Asian republics and Iran. In particular, Pakistan may lose the biggest factor favouring its ties with Central Asia — its shortest outlet to the world.

If hostilities in Afghanistan continue for many years, Central Asian states will be forced to turn away from an uncertain link with Pakistan. They may be obliged to depend on the Commonwealth of Independent States, led by the Russian Federation, which could then acquire a capacity to sustain the confederacy. Or, with Western capital assistance, the Central Asians may succeed in finding alternative outlets.

The Afghan civil war will also make heavy demands on Pakistan's resources. A majority of the Afghan families, uprooted in the conflict, will make for Peshawar — as they are doing already — and Islamabad will have to cope with a permanent refugee problem. Hekmatyar's need of military hardware will be met by his allies — and mercenaries — in Pakistan. It is unlikely that the government of Pakistan will succeed in preventing this gun-running, assuming that it will have the inclination and the will to try that. Continued arms traffic across the fragile boundary will keep the Frontier regions unstable and aggravate the crisis in Pakistani society caused by the glut of weapons.

Further, a conflict-ridden Afghanistan will continue to rely on Pakistan for the bulk of its requirements of food and a host of essential items. The smugglers and their associates in preventive agencies will make fortunes at the cost of Pakistani people, who will face an endless cycle of shortages and inflationary pressures.

An alternative scenario is that Hekmatyar does succeed in establishing his kingdom in Kabul and also in imposing some kind of peace in a greater part of the country, if not the whole of it. In that case, too, the threat to Pakistan will continue.

Hekmatyar's claim to lion's

share in the Afghanistan's power structure rests, apart from his having been the main beneficiary of arms delivered to fight the Soviet, on a mixture of religious fundamentalism (of the Sunni variety) and the Pakhtun's dream of a greater national state. Both these props are potentially dangerous for Pakistan. A fundamentalist Afghanistan will on the one hand undermine Pakistan's efforts to create a new bloc — something like ECO, a grouping of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian States — on the other hand it will undermine Pakistan's ability to fight the fundamentalists at home. Likewise, Hekmatyar's allies may find new friends in Pakistan's disturbed Pakhtun areas, both in the NWFP and Balochistan.

Islamabad has no one else to blame for landing itself into a no-win position. It is now confronted with the consequences of pursuing a military policy, which ran counter to its long-term national interest. Pakistan's interest always dictated a demilitarised Afghanistan, ruled by consensus among its various nationalities and social groups, and committed to a gradual process of democratisation, emancipation from religious and tribal constraints and economic growth. Only such an Afghanistan could also furnish an essential bridge to link the emerging Central Asian states with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Islamabad ignored its vital national interest when it allowed the Geneva Accord to be sabotaged in 1987-88, again when it insisted on the dismantling of the Najibullah regime after the Soviet withdrawal and finally when it promoted a Peshawar Accord, which excluded a whole range of liberal elements from power-sharing.

Post-Najibullah Afghanistan needed a civil government of national reconciliation, affording accommodation to all shades of political opinion and social interests. What Pakistan offered in the form of the Peshawar Accord was an inadequate compact imposed on reluctant parties, which assumed an understanding among the mujahideen factions while none of it existed. The govern-

ment exported from Peshawar had no means to guarantee peace and even if it could achieve that, it promised the Afghan people nothing, but regression in politics, economy and culture.

The question now is whether Pakistan has any possibilities of preventing further carnage in Afghanistan and protecting its interests — regional as well as domestic. The first part of the proposition is hard to answer. It is difficult to believe that any party in the world can persuade the warring Afghan factions to silence their guns. All these factions comprise the most conservative elements of the Afghan society, who speak only in the language of guns. They have been greatly dehumanised by the brutalising experience of a decade-long war. It will be quite some time before their thirst for bloodshed is quenched.

But Pakistan and other countries concerned (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, to name only the more prominent) still have a few cards which could, if properly played, save Afghanistan from a prolonged state of anarchy and even lay the foundations of a stable government of national conciliation.

The first thing these countries have to do is to make it clear to the feuding Afghan factions, particularly to Hekmatyar, that they will not support an Afghan government which excludes any section of opinion on the grounds of its past affiliations, which does not accommodate the liberal elements of various hues. It is necessary to announce that decision made on the battlefield will not amount to determination of Afghanistan's future by its people.

Second, all Afghan warlords must be made to realise that while the arms in their stocks can enable them to kill thousands of their hapless compatriots, they cannot feed the millions of mouths upon guns and grenades. Their people need food, clothing and opportunities of work. They need materials to rebuild their houses and ploughs and seeds to cultivate their farms.

The reconstruction of

Afghanistan is a tall order, which may not be met, even with the world's generous support, for many long years. Afghanistan's leaders will need a lot of cash resources to buy their essential requirements. They must not be left in any doubt that these resources will be made available to them only on receiving from the proofs of responsible behaviour. This lever will have more effective than realise today.

The only hitch on this approach is that it will impose on Pakistan the role of a new kind of frontline state. It will have to seal its border with Afghanistan and stop all traffic, but this is so urgent a task that peace with India could be justified on this account alone. True, such measures will incur the displeasure of present warlords, but Pakistan will hope to win the friendship of the coming Afghan generations, who will benefit from peace. A more important decision Islamabad will need to take is whether it is time to break with fundamentalists at home.

Frontier Post 9/1

Afghan prisoners found in Tashkent

It has been revealed that some of the political prisoners arrested during the communist regime were kept in the former Soviet Union.

A member of the Mujahiddi family told the BBC in Islamabad that he has received letters from Ibrahim Mujahiddi and eight of his sons informing him that they are alive and in Uzbekistan. They were arrested during the time of Taraki and their family thought that they were dead. Prof. Mujahiddi wanted to send a delegation from Kabul to Uzbekistan to investigate the report, but Uzbekistan's government did not respond.

Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan, raised the issue with President Karimov during his recent visit to Uzbekistan. Karimov admitted that there were some Afghan political prisoners in Uzbekistan but he did not know whether members of Mujahiddi's family were there or not.

If the claim turns out to be true, it confirms the allegation by Afghans that some political prisoners were transferred and kept in the former Soviet Union.

The transfer took place at a time when the republics in Central Asia had little control over their affairs. The central government and KGB were the true rulers of the country.

This revelation has given hope to many Afghan families whose members are missing. This will have an effect on the fate of Soviet POWs caught by the Mujahideen. In order to get the release of their prisoners, Russia and other CIS countries should provide full information about Afghan POWs and children taken for indoctrination.

One of these children, who returned from Russia after 8 years to Kabul some weeks ago, did not know the address of his family and had forgotten the name of his father. He was shown on TV so that his relatives could pick him up.

The Russian parliament has passed a bill asking the government to present a resolution to the UN General Assembly asking for the release of all Soviet prisoners.

Rustoi, the Vice President of Russia and an Afghan veteran, is the

head of the committee seeking the release of Soviet POWs.

Since 1989, the Mujahideen have released 11 POWs. One of them was released by Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Masood after the fall of the Kabul regime.

The United States is helping Russia and other former Soviet republics to get information about their prisoners of war held by the Mujahideen in return for Russian help to find American POWs missing since the Vietnam war.

American officials visiting Kabul recently stopped in Moscow and Kiev on their way home to deliver photographs of prisoners and other information about them.

Washington has been helping the Afghan interim leadership find about 500 children taken to the Soviet Union since 1980. Moscow has said the children were orphans. Afghans say they have been taken away, often against the wishes of their families, to be indoctrinated.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin had asked a US Senate Committee during his visit to Washington in June for help to resolve the issue of Soviet POWs in Afghanistan. Yeltsin promised to help tracking of American missing soldiers during the Vietnam war. It is said that some of these prisoners were transferred to camps inside the Soviet Union.

AFGHANews 7/15

Hardline Afghan guerrillas are now dueling the devil

By ANDREW ROCHE

KABUL (Reuters-Kyodo) Convinced that it was divine aid that brought them victory in their 14-year "holy war," Islamic fundamentalists among the Afghan mujahideen are determined not to lose the peace to Satan.

Already it is harder to buy a can of beer in Kabul than a Kalashnikov assault rifle.

It is not advisable for a woman to appear in public without her head covered. According to Deputy Justice Minister Abdul Rahim, more is to follow.

"By the will of God, when Sharia law comes to Afghanistan, there will be no place for any other law," Rahim said.

The code prescribes 80 lashes of the whip for anyone caught drinking alcohol, penalties up to the death sentence for trading in drink, stoning to death for adultery and the severing of a hand or foot for theft, Rahim said.

Antialcohol vigilantes are quick to associate drink with the former Soviet-backed government of deposed president Najibullah.

"Members of the despotic and tyrannical communist regime kept eye-catching quantities of such beverages in the hotels, their residences and state establishments for their use when Muslim Afghans were facing starvation," Afghanistan's news agency quoted one vigilante as saying in a speech over the smashed vodka bottles.

In less publicized incidents, the traders of Kabul's Chicken Street—who sell everything from 19th century bayonets to Russian caviar—complain of their stocks of beer being carried away by guerrillas using the new religious atmosphere as a pretext for simple looting.

Plans are under way to segregate the sexes in schools and universities, and some fundamentalists are pressing for female staff to be removed from government offices.

"When a woman works alongside a male stranger, Satan sits with them."

One mullah told a gathering of guerrilla commanders in Kabul's former royal summer palace, gutted in the fighting between rival guerrilla factions which followed Najibullah's overthrow last month.

"Until there is Sharia law we will not lay down our rockets and Kalashnikovs."

Rahim said the question of whether women would be allowed to vote in future Afghan elections was still under discussion.

Hardliners argue they are returning the country to its traditions after 14 years of godless communism. But moderate parties in the mujahideen government, and many ordinary Kabulites, say they are forcing on Afghans an alien zealotry imported from Iran and the Arab world.

"Islam is being used for purely political motives, to imply that if you are not a fundamentalist you are somehow like the communists," said one official of a pro-Western party who asked not be identified.

Moderates in the faction-ridden coalition say they are being cowed into silence on religious matters by fundamentalist parties whose attitude is, literally, holier-than-thou.

"Islam is being used for purely political motives, to imply that if you are not a fundamentalist you are somehow like the communists," said one official of a pro-Western party who asked not be identified.

Kabul law

KABUL, the capital of Afghanistan, is without power and piped water. Its buildings are shattered following months of fighting between bands of mujahideen guerrillas who fell out after taking over from a communist government in April. What the mujahideen are providing in Kabul in abundance is sharia, or Islamic, law. On September 7th three men were executed on the orders of an Islamic court that met in private. They were said to have confessed to murder and looting.

They were hanged on a makeshift wooden scaffold in a park in central Kabul. Dozens of men carrying rifles, machineguns and even rocket-launchers stood guard in case, it was said, an attempt was made to rescue the condemned men.

This was the first public execution that most Kabulites could remember. But a Muslim cleric sitting by the scaffold said there would be more. Other offenders had been detained. For lesser offences such as robbery and drinking alcohol the punishments would include cutting off hands and feet, he said. *The Economist*



Return of the natives

Refugee exodus from Pakistani camps is on

By Hamish McDonald in Torkham, Khyber Pass

Salauddin, a bearded man in a white embroidered skull-cap, was impatient to get going as soon as his papers were stamped. Down the road, a truck waited, piled high with his possessions, his wife and four children sitting on top. Beyond an open iron gate, a guardhouse with three Kalashnikov-slung mujahideen and a display case showing a variety of anti-personnel mines, a sign said: "Welcome to the Islamic State of Afghanistan."

After 10 years in a refugee camp in Pakistan, Salauddin was going home. On the same day, and every day, about 6,000 Afghans like him and his family pass through the border gates at Torkham, with farm animals, roofing timbers, wheat sacks, rope-beds and bicycles strapped into wildly decorated trucks.

Scores of people are still getting killed and maimed in battles between rival mujahideen groups in the capital Kabul, but to the Afghan refugees the 14 years of war in their country ended in April with the fall of the Najibullah regime once backed by Moscow.

The flow of returnees has since been rapidly emptying the Pakistan refugee camps that held about 2.7 million people at the peak. Since the start of this year, nearly 600,000 Afghans have returned — 225,000 in June alone.

"It is one of the largest spontaneous repatriations in our organisation's history," said Pierce Gerety, deputy head of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakistan. "It is taking place with minimal assistance and largely organised by the refugees themselves."


The return migration is removing one of the nightmares the Afghanistan war created for Pakistan — that the millions of Afghan refugees, with their fierce tribal codes, would become a permanent presence in the Northwest Frontier Province and keep infusing the politics of the gun throughout the country.

The path back begins at one of nine centres run by the UNHCR. Here, family heads trade in their refugee camp ration entitlement for a repatriation allowance of Rs 3,300 (US\$132) and 300 kilograms of wheat, judged enough to support an aver-

age family of six people for three months. The returnees have to pay for their own transport (Salauddin paid Rs 4,200 to hire his truck), seed, and housing materials.

What lies ahead for the returnees, once their trucks head down the 74 kilometre, two-lane highway to Jalalabad, is uncertain. Salauddin went back on a scouting trip by himself. "My house in Logar is destroyed, and the irrigation system is wrecked," he said. "I'll probably go and look for work in Kabul, maybe as a driver because I've been driving a taxi in Pakistan. But people in Kabul were also having a hard time when I went there. The Dostam militia were stopping people, taking their watches and jewelry."

Mohammad Khan, a farmer from near



On the road to home in Afghanistan.

Jalalabad who was returning home with his eight dependents, had also been back to look first. "There is no shade in my village," he said. "There are no trees left, no walls, no irrigation channels."

The first thing he plans to do is build a shelter, and then start planting the seeds he brought from Pakistan. He knows that some people from his village have been killed by some of the millions of mines scattered across Afghanistan. "I do not know how we will deal with these things," Khan said. "I will ask God to help me."

The meagreness of the help being given to the returnees is something that shames many international officials. The 350,000 Cambodian refugees, by contrast, get free transport home, housing, and nine months' food supply. Only US\$29.4 million has been pledged humanitarian aid for Afghanistan for the second half of this year.

Out of this, US\$18.8 million is earmarked for the repatriation grants, and it is

being paid out at the rate of US\$2 million a week. Any new pledges are remitted through to the National Bank of Pakistan in Peshawar within 48 hours. Operating with almost zero cash reserves, UNHCR officials worry that at any moment they might have to turn away huge numbers of would-be returnees — which could cause massive unrest.

What is left over in the pledged amount for food aid, health measures, restoration of agriculture and mine clearance within Afghanistan is pitifully small. The ending of wheat supplies from the former Soviet Union and the huge numbers going back create the prospect of mass starvation unless more crops are planted this summer and more aid donated.

"There will be a very serious situation if more funds are not forthcoming," said Benon Sevan, the UN secretary-general's personal representative on Afghanistan. "Unless there are funds for agriculture, there will be a rush to urban centres which are already bursting. All conditions should be created so people can go back and immediately start working in the fields."

"For example, we have asked for money to buy seeds for these people, but not a single dollar has been pledged," he said. "The emphasis is on getting them across, not on what happens inside. We are asking for basic requirements, the minimum for survival. The Afghans deserve better."

Many things are pushing the Afghans back. They are aware that sooner or later the rations in the camp will stop and that employment in Pakistan is getting harder to find and they want to get in before the money runs out. They want to get back and get houses built

and crops harvested before winter sets in. Some fear being left isolated in Pakistan without the protection of fellow tribesmen.

Even without a change of government, the UN was expecting about 100,000 to return this year, against about 40,000 who went back in 1991. With the new order in Kabul, the flow has become a flood. "My country is now free, so it is time to go," said farmer Mohammad Khan.

The Afghans are far more optimistic — or stoic — about the prospects for their return than many of the foreign aid workers. But, they are not going back ignorant about the conditions at home. For years, many of the men slipped out of the open camps, across the open border, to fight the Soviets or the Najibullah regime and do a little farming on the side. Some from nearby areas have already been sending younger people across to start the planting, while dependants remain in the camps. ■

Try Again in Afghanistan

By Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady

ALTHOUGH the war in Afghanistan no longer makes headlines in the West, the suffering of the Afghans is still comparable to that of the Somalis and Bosnians.

Heavily armed rival groups have caused much destruction and killing in the past four months. They have looted public and private property on a very large scale and have engaged in mass kidnapping of the residents of Kabul. They have frequently shelled residential areas in the city, killing thousands and forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee for safety in other provinces or outside the country. The interim government does not exercise any meaningful authority over Kabul or the rest of the country. It is just one of the many armed groups involved in this destruction and killing.

The main reason for this chaos and violence is that numerous heavily armed groups want to dominate the country but lack the power to prevail over the others. They are also unable to form alliances with other groups to defeat their common opponents. Most of these armed groups are supported by Pakistan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. The intensity of violence between these groups reflects the intensity of rivalries in the Middle East, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The sudden collapse of the communist regime last April created a military and political vacuum that encouraged a struggle for power among the rival armed groups. Some of the leading contenders for power, such as Ahmed Shah Masoud and Gulbuddin Hek-

matyaz, believed that controlling Kabul would enable them to establish their authority throughout the country. This explains the ferocity of the fighting and, consequently, the extreme suffering of the people in Kabul.

Forces loyal to the interim government are incapable of establishing their control over Kabul or the rest of the country, but their opponents cannot defeat these forces either. Most of these armed groups, which had gained legitimacy during the war against the Soviet invaders, have now, because of their utter disregard for human life, pretty much exhausted their legitimacy.

The interim government, unable to provide security, cannot attract international financial assistance. The government is broke. Similarly, in the absence of peace and order, economic reconstruction cannot be promoted. This makes life harder for the people and adds to the financial crisis of the government.

However, this new political and military stalemate has created an environment that may help the United Nations to negotiate a comprehensive political settlement for the conflict. The UN must soon renew its efforts to achieve peace in Afghanistan.

ENDING foreign financial and military aid to the various armed groups is a prerequisite for the success of a political solution. The UN must convince Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan to terminate their financial and military support for their Afghan clients.

Inasmuch as the efforts of each regional power to establish its dominance in Afghanistan have been counteracted by rival powers, it is quite likely that these states will soon realize that no

one can achieve quick and lasting victory in Afghanistan and will end their futile rivalry there. The UN had made significant progress in this regard before the collapse of the communist regime last April. Now, once again, the prospects are bright for a successful UN initiative.

The UN must also pursue its earlier efforts to convene a meeting of some 500 prominent Afghans to elect an interim government. Although the list that the UN has prepared may not be a perfectly representative one, it is certainly more representative than the "decision-making" and "consultative" councils that the current powerless government has established. Upon the election of the new interim government, the international community should provide the new government with political and financial support. The interim government should promptly build a new defense and security force.

International aid should provide the new defense force with adequate weapons to effectively deal with any challenger. Of course, the defense force should be nonpartisan, but the government should allow former *mujahideen* to join the defense force on an individual basis.

The intensity of ethnic, sectarian, and regional conflicts in Afghanistan has increased substantially in the past few years. These issues should be addressed after the restoration of peace and the rebuilding of state institutions. The current level of instability promotes extremism and does not allow a lasting resolution of these conflicts. The interim government should prepare a constitution for the country. Controversial issues must be justly resolved, within the framework of national

unity, during the constitutional discussions.

The constitution ought to be based on democracy and the right to political participation for all groups and individuals. After the ratification of the constitution by a constitutional convention, parliamentary elections should be held under UN supervision; teams of observers from international institutions concerned with the fairness of elections, such as the Carter Center, should also be allowed to monitor the elections. The results of the elections should provide the basis for the formation of a popularly elected permanent government.

The people of Afghanistan are crying out for international help to end the bloodshed. Aided by the new military and political stalemate, the UN must renew its efforts to achieve peace there. The United States, Japan, and the European Community ought to support the UN role—not for strategic considerations, but because of their support for popularly elected governments and concern for life and human rights throughout the world.

■ Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady is professor of political science at Providence College.

CSM 8/24



by telephone for food for the refugees. "We just don't have anything to give them. They are arriving with nothing," he said.

Much of Afghanistan's countryside is littered with land mines and decimated by warfare, and Wanrooy warned that without an injection of emergency food supplies, many will starve.

Few countries have heeded a 3-month-old appeal from U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali for \$181 million to help refugees return home and to feed millions of Afghans displaced in their own country, Wanrooy said.

"I'm afraid a lot of them will die in there," he said.

Ashbury Park Press

August 16, 1992

Tide of Afghan refugees flows into Pakistan

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — After nearly a week of dodging rebel rockets, sleeping in roadside ditches and foraging for food and water, thousands of Afghans have streamed across the border into Pakistan, United Nations officials said yesterday.

Packed into trucks, the refugees, mostly women and children, arrived worn and weary. Others arrived in mud-covered ambulances.

Warring rebel factions have shelled thousands of rockets on the Afghan capital, Kabul, since Aug. 5, killing and wounding thousands, mostly

civilians. In the past week alone, 1,000 have been killed, the government said.

Entire neighborhoods have been destroyed, hospitals are overflowing with wounded, and both water and electricity were cut several days ago. . . .

"My God, my family is living under a mulberry tree. We found what was left of our house. It was hopeless. We left," said weary refugee Mohammad Gul in Pakistan.

Until last week, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Pakistan was scrambling to help nearly

a third of Pakistan's 3 million Afghan refugees return home. But the exodus has grown with renewed rebel fighting.

U.N. official Reindout Wanrooy said the refugees arriving in Pakistan are only a small percentage of those fleeing Kabul, most of whom seek shelter in the countryside.

At least 20,000 Afghans were huddled on the banks of the Kabul River, 8 miles east of the capital, waiting for transportation anywhere.

Shamal, a guerrilla commander in the eastern city of Jalalabad, pleaded

EVENTS

AFGHANISTAN: THE STRUGGLE WITHIN, a film by Rafi Ameer, will be shown at the Downtown Community TV Center on Saturday, October 23 at * 7:30 p.m. There will be a discussion of the film as well as live music performances. Admission \$3. On December 10, the film will be shown at The Asia Society, also with a panel on the situation in Afghanistan. Panelists will include Barnett Rubin & Amin Tarzi. Details in the next FORUM. Connecticut PBS stations will air the film on October 14th at 11 p.m. (Check your local listings.)

From the Editor:

The news from Kabul is so bad we're ready to believe the story that new graffiti on walls left standing in Kabul says "Take your seven donkeys & give us back our ox."

Thanks to all of you who sent information on organizations - and everything else. Please keep it up. And don't forget to send us abstracts. We know some of you are giving papers. The deadline for the next issue is November 1.


The 26th Annual Meeting of the MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION will take place at the Hilton Hotel in Portland, Oregon from October 29 - Nov. 1, 1992. There are two panels scheduled on Afghanistan: Friday, Oct. 30 from 1:30 - 3:30 p.m. THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISES IN AFGHANISTAN, chaired by Siddieq Noorzoy. Panelists include Ludwig Adamec, Nazif Shahrani, Grant Farr & Ralph Magnus. Saturday, October 31 from 8:00 - 10:00 a.m. STATE OF THE ART OF AFGHAN STUDIES, chaired by Senzil Nawid. Papers include "An Anthropological Survey" by Amin Tarzi; "The Status of Economic Information" by M.S. Noorzoy; "A Revisionist View of the Afghan War" by David Gibbs; "Contemporary Persian Literature in Afghanistan" by S. Wali Ahmadi; & "The State of the Art in Political Science Studies" by Ralph Magnus. Robert McChesney will be the discussant. Other panels which may be of interest include CURRENT CULTURAL & POLITICAL TRENDS IN CENTRAL ASIA on Oct. 29th from 1:30 - 3:30; THEMES & ARTISTRY: THE MANY FACES OF JALAL-DIN RUMI on October 29th from 4 - 6. There are a number of panels on Turkic & Persian literature scheduled. Registration at the door is \$75 (\$60 for members).

Plan ahead so you can attend a concert of MUSIC OF AFGHANISTAN by Shah Wali Taranasaz & Aziz Herawi at Queens College, Flushing, NY, on January 9th at 8 p.m. Tickets will be \$12 and may be ordered in advance from WORLD MUSIC INSTITUTE, 49 West 27th Street, Suite 810, New York, NY 10001. Make checks payable to the Institute & enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

RECENT PUBLICATION

"My search for Nader Ali," story & photos by Tony O'Brien, in the August issue of LIFE MAGAZINE.

(More on page 32.)



* 87 Lafayette Street, NYC. (212) 966-4510.

Full Agony of Long War Convulses Afghan Capital

By Molly Moore
Washington Post Foreign Service

KABUL, Afghanistan—The rocky roads that snake out of the Afghan capital are jammed these days with families fleeing two weeks of brutal artillery bombardment and the anarchy of warring ethnic factions looting and terrorizing residents.

Overloaded trucks and buses and bedraggled families on foot await lulls in the fighting to run a gauntlet of military posts that mark the territories of rival commanders. Trucks and buses of refugees line the roads as far away as Pakistan, a treacherous 10-hour drive to the east. Thousands of homeless families huddle in campsites along the roads for miles outside Kabul.

"My house is destroyed. I have left everything," said Muhammad Babrak, a civil engineer who was herding his wife and six daughters into the back of a crowded truck. "I lived here all during the civil war. After all that, now I am forced to leave."

During the 14-year war between Afghanistan's Soviet-backed communist government and U.S.-supported mujaheddin guerrillas, this city was an oasis of relative calm. It was heavily defended by the government—and, for years, by the Soviet army—and its population swelled during the war as refugees from the devastated countryside sought safety here.

But four months after a mujaheddin government took over from the collapsed authority of President Najibullah, the exchange of destruction among Afghanistan's ethnic and religious militias continues. And now, it is Kabul's turn.

For two weeks, the mujaheddin faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has leveled entire blocks of Kabul with artillery and rockets in an assault more violent than any on Kabul during the mujaheddin's war against the former communists and their Soviet-army backers. An estimated 1,400 people have been killed or wounded in the past two weeks.

But many refugees said they were fleeing even though their own homes have been untouched. Kabul has become a city of anarchy, they said, where fighters routinely assault and rob citizens of rival ethnic groups. Although the government has imposed a 10 p.m. curfew, the streets are deserted by dusk.

"You cannot even wear a watch on the streets of Kabul without fear that someone will steal it from you," said one man who has lived here for 25 years.

In April, the mujaheddin captured Kabul, with control of most of the city falling to forces from northern

and central Afghanistan, including ethnic Tajik and ethnic Hazara mujaheddin. President Burhanuddin Rabbani is a Tajik mujaheddin leader.

Hekmatyar said he attacked the Kabul government because of its reliance on the formerly pro-Najibullah Uzbeks and because Rabbani has been too slow in purging his forces of military officers appointed by the former communist regime.

Hekmatyar's critics noted that he also has allied with ex-communist officers who share his Pashtun nationalism. Rabbani said the attacks were intended primarily to destabilize the government and dismissed Hekmatyar and his representatives from the coalition government's ruling council.

Hekmatyar has said he has fired only at government military installations, but shells and missiles have slammed into residential neighborhoods. One refugee stumbled across the border into Pakistan last week, sobbing that he had lost all seven of his children when a bomb destroyed his house.

Many of the weapons being used to batter Kabul were supplied by the United States. Hekmatyar received the highest quality—and one of the largest shares—of the U.S. and Saudi-funded weapons funneled to the mujaheddin during their 14-year war against the communists, according to Pakistani and Western intelligence officials interviewed this year. He has retained large supplies of such weapons, which some military analysts in the region say could keep him well armed for another two years.

Most of Kabul has been without electricity or water for more than a week, leading health officials to warn of the danger of cholera and other diseases. Two rockets destroyed a pharmacy operated by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The ICRC has managed to truck some medical supplies into the city, but hospitals are almost out of medicines, according to Andreas Pfiffner, a Red Cross official. He said the Red Cross hospital, designed to accommodate 300 people, found itself trying to treat almost 500 in the first days of the shelling.

"Patients were lying everywhere—on the floor and in every possible space," said Pfiffner. "It was difficult to walk in the hospital."

For the past few days, the road leading east from the city, where

some of the most intensive shelling has occurred, has been a sea of sobbing women, grim-faced men and frightened children. Women cling to the outside of buses headed toward safety. Huge trucks were piled with beds, bicycles, and household possessions—and sometimes two dozen or more people balanced precariously on top.

Many people escaped on foot, tugging cows or guiding small flocks of goats. One elderly man trudged down the road pushing a wheelbarrow full of live, trussed chickens.

The village of Pul-i-Charkhi, site of Afghanistan's most notorious prison, on the eastern edge of Kabul, has become a gathering point for thousands of refugees seeking buses headed eastward toward the city of Jalalabad and Pakistan. Last week, refugees filled the streets of the medieval wall-walled village. Bus drivers lined their brightly painted vehicles along the narrow dirt streets next to donkey carts and horse-drawn wagons, shouting their destinations: "Jalalabad!" "Peshawar!" "Jalalabad!"

Hundreds of makeshift tents and straw huts have been erected along the shoulders of the highway and the muddy banks of the Kabul River, which slices through a gorge between craggy mountains east of the city.

Some of the few remaining United Nations officers in Kabul visited the encampments last week, hoping to find ways to provide food, water and sanitation. Last week, women were washing dishes and clothes in the same ditches where children and men were urinating.

U.N. official Robert Breen said that the United Nations—which has pulled all but four of its foreign staffers out of Kabul—originally believed the refugees would be able to return to the city quickly. But now, with the roadside encampments becoming overcrowded, Breen said, U.N. officials believe it could be weeks or months before families can return to the city.

The refugees' road of escape to the east is often closed by crossfire as the factions battle with artillery and missiles from the hills on either side. Even when there is no combat, many refugees say they have been harassed by the various groups that control sections of the road.

Kabul's refugees have scattered in many directions, making an accurate count difficult. Some Afghan officials said as many as 100,000 of the city's estimated 1.5 million residents have fled. Pakistani officials said an average of 1,000 Kabul refugees are crossing its border in the Khyber Pass region each day.

The wave of refugees fleeing Kabul is especially discouraging to

many Afghans, coming as an estimated 1 million refugees have returned to the country in the past year from camps in Pakistan and Iran, seeking to rebuild innumerable villages destroyed in the war.

Afghanistan's infighting is not limited to Kabul. Frequent combat has been reported between a Saudi-backed Sunni Muslim party and an Iranian-backed Shiite coalition west of the capital, and a separate conflict has been fought on the road from Kabul north.

Adobe forts and artillery stand in silhouette on ridges along the highway linking Kabul with Pakistan. Travel along the roads connecting Afghanistan's largest towns is treacherous, with bandits from various militias robbing and harassing travelers, frequently extorting payment for allowing a car or truck to cross their territory.

Hekmatyar's associates say the shelling of Kabul will continue until the government purges its military

forces of former communist officers, sends Dostam's Uzbek forces out of Kabul and calls elections. "The communists are still functioning," said Hekmatyar's chief spokesman, Nawab Saleem, a one-time student at Northern Virginia Community College in suburban Washington. "The militias should have been disbanded and sent back to the villages."

"This fighting is just for power," said Yunus Khalis, an aging, Pashtun tribal leader with a long flame-red, dyed beard who heads a prominent mujaheddin faction.

As has periodically been the case in Afghan history, the rivalries of ethnic groups are being fueled from outside. The weapons of the current battles are left over from the years in which the United States and Soviet Union poured materiel into what proved to be the last Cold War proxy fight. Wealthy Saudi religious foundations, militant Islamic political groups in Iran, and a powerful Pakistani Muslim fundamentalist party continue to back one Afghan group or another, according to military specialists and diplomats in the region.

The combatants here are overwhelmingly young men raised in wartime who grew up with guns slung over their shoulders. It is not unusual to see boys as young as 6 with pistols strapped to their waists.

Mohammed Babrak, the engineer whose home was destroyed, watched his daughters settle into the back of a crowded truck, and shook his head sadly as he turned to join them. "Peace will not come here anytime soon."

WASHINGTON POST 8/23

Afghanistan: waiting for peace

Tasavvar Alam Awan

Anarchy and lawlessness reigns in Kabul. The Afghan capital is receiving frequent showers of rockets and missiles. There exists no central authority. Each street is ruled by different armed groups, as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Hezb-i-Islami leader, has pointed out. Looting, plunder, theft and abductions are the order of the day. Kabul's citizens face acute shortages of food and fuel. The rising price of goods of daily use put these beyond the reach of the average citizen. As a result, a large number of Afghan families have fled from Kabul to other cities. Some of

them have also reached Peshawar. According to some newspaper reports, some three hundred thousand Afghans have crossed the borders into neighbouring Tajikistan, a newly independent Muslim Republic of the former Soviet Union.

President Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, has so far not succeeded in forging unity among parties. Even after more than three months since the establishment of an Islamic government in Kabul, no major breakthrough has been achieved by the mujahideen to consolidate themselves in power. The provinces are more autonomous than ever. Five provinces of the North are run by Rasid Dostum, head of powerful Gelam Jam militia. The Southern

province of Nangarhar which is being governed by a joint Mujahideen Shura has thrown away its allegiance to the Kabul government. Maulvi Yunus Khalis, head of his own faction of the Hezb-i-Islami, has suspended his membership of the Leadership Council and has withdrawn his support. Prof. Sayraf is also not pleased with the present set up in the capital. Hekmatyar has built up military pressure against the regime, though his nominated Prime Minister Ustad Abdul Saboor Farid is helplessly trying to ascertain his authority.

Hekmatyar vehemently demands the removal of the Uzbek militia from Kabul while Defence Minister Alunad Shah Masoud, who aligned

with Rasid Dostum, is not ready to forego his military strength by expelling the militia from Kabul.

According to the latest reports, Hekmatyar has not yet given a deadline for this purpose, but war can break out any time. He has authorized his men to fire at military planes. And if war is ensued to settle the scores, horrendous civilian casualties are feared. Afghan nation who suffered heavily during the last decade and a half of foreign invasion, cannot bear the brunt of a yet another war of a different kind.

Kabul is humming with roaming armed groups causing big hazards to the citizens. Some of these gangs have occupied state buildings and even a few ministries as well. Some

two weeks back, the government tried to clear the capital of such unlicensed (unauthorized) groups, but this 'clean up operation' had to be suspended half way due to the resentment showed by certain parties. Kabul remains under threat as long as the warring sides do not come to a mutually acceptable, and, more importantly, a lasting agreement. What is required is political acumen on the part of Afghan leadership. Like all nations of the world, they can also devise ways and means best suited to their own culture, to get out of the quagmire of problems they are stuck in.

There are many incentives to make peace. One such is that a stable government in Kabul will attract

world aid. The repatriation of 5 million refugees to their homeland will also get a boost. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan are two gigantic tasks in front of Afghan leadership. Mines clearance will take years and decades. All these jobs are to be done by Afghans themselves. World Community will doubtlessly come to their help only if they (Afghans) help themselves.

Frontier Post 8/17

It must be remembered that more war will only pave the way for Afghanistan's disintegration, besides, destabilising the whole region. It is necessary therefore that personal grudges and selfish attitudes be done away with. Personal and party interests should now be put behind national goals and demands.



Negali (Kabul) 8/31

Govt concerned about arms smuggling to Hezb-i-Islami

ASHRAF HASHMI

ISLAMABAD, Sept 2: The Federal Government is understood to have taken a serious view of the activities of a religio-political party which in total disregard to Pakistan's position is reportedly engaged in smuggling arms and manpower to help Hekmatyar group in its fight against President Rabbani's government. These activities are considered as an attempt to sabotage Pakistan's neutrality in the on-going Afghanistan war.

A Foreign Office spokesman when asked to comment on a report published in The Muslim to the effect that 14 trucks loaded with heavy arms were stopped at Torkhum border said that the report was self-explanatory. He said the government was to conduct a top-level inquiry to ascertain if some secret agency was involved and who had forged the permission letter for carrying

these arms in the name of a responsible officer of a secret agency.

The spokesman said that one of the reasons to seal the borders along Afghanistan was to stop the smuggling of arms and manpower. "Pakistan is strictly following a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and the government would ensure that no arms were sent from Pakistan to any of the warring factions inside Afghanistan."

The government, he said, has also checked the inflow of the Afghan refugees as it did not want the revival of the refugee problem. "Pakistan is in full agreement with the proposal of the governor of Nangarhar province that the refugees camps should be established in his province and the assistance to them from the United Nations should get to them directly. Pakistan, he said would also help

in sending relief goods to those refugees who had been forced to leave their houses in Kabul by the civil war there.

Pakistan, the spokesman said, had done its best to bring about peace in Kabul and was keen that the cease-fire there was durable. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Siddique Kanju, during his recent visit to Kabul had helped in the process of peace as a result of which an agreement between the Hekmatyar group and President Rabbani was signed. Pakistan, he said hoped the agreement would be implemented and the two sides would come to a conference table to settle their differences.



Shahadat 9/3

The spokesman said the Governments of Pakistan and Iran had been in constant touch over the developments in Afghanistan. He said that these contacts and consultation at the higher level would continue.

He expressed the hope that the forthcoming visit of the Iranian President, Hujatullah Ali Akbar Hashmi Rafsanjani would further facilitate our concerted efforts to bring peace in the war-torn Afghanistan.

THE MUSLIM 9/3

On Day of Rest, the Only Battles in Kabul Are in Cockfight Ring

By MARK FINEMAN
TIMES STAFF WRITER

KABUL, Afghanistan—The scene in Babur's Gardens on Friday, Afghanistan's official day of rest, hardly befit a city on the eve of destruction.

With just 48 hours left before a deadline for surrender or war, the betting was as fast and furious as ever in the garden's daylong cockfights, a century-old tradition that is a fitting metaphor for a country so long at war.

Old men sat in clumps nearby, betting on dice and cards. There were jokes and laughter, smiles and hugs and a line of children waiting for a rickety carnival ride.

Friday seemed an ordinary day in the park of Afghanistan's ancient warrior king—except for a brief and telling scene at Babur's simple hillside tomb.

A *mujahedeen* commander loyal to the hard-line rebel leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the man who has threatened to take this city by force, approached an American correspondent.

Commander Mohammed Abdul Gaffar was cautious at first. It was, after all, the first time in 13 years of guerrilla war he had legally entered his enemy's stronghold unharmed. And it was just hours away from his leader's promised hour of destruction: Hekmatyar had vowed to attack Kabul if its isolated regime fails to yield it to the *mujahedeen* by Sunday.

Gaffar wore his black beard long and his turban wrapped loose in the style of his fundamentalist party leader. But he had a message far different from the threats issued from Hekmatyar's camp.

"We commanders have thought it over and decided that if Hekmatyar does not agree to form a coalition with all the other *mujahedeen* groups, we will go ahead and start it without him," Gaffar said in whispered tones, referring to a moderate rebel coalition that has been negotiating an orderly transfer of power to the Muslim guerrillas since the fall of Afghan dictator Najibullah last week.

"We can come to Kabul. We can come into town. In fact, we can capture Kabul anytime we want to now. But we commanders don't want there to be any fighting."

In fact, the mission that brought Gaffar into the capital was to negotiate, to meet surreptitiously with Afghan army officers from his home region of the Ghorban Valley north of Kabul and persuade them to join forces with the coalition.

"I don't know the future," he concluded, stressing that he deliberately left his weapons behind in his village. "But our mission is finished. We have made these contacts to make Afghanistan one country. Now, we are just watch-

ing and waiting to see what happens."

So, it appeared, was the rest of Kabul on Friday.

Outside the nation's only television station, a single sentry guarded the outer compound wall. Another soldier was stretched out asleep atop the tank posted outside the country's telecommunications center. Markets bustled, the traffic jammed, and colorful weddings filled the city's hotel ballrooms.

But with a dizzying array of heavily armed *mujahedeen* groups—known as moderates in the spectrum of Afghan guerrilla politics—now in firm control of every entrance to the city, Friday had another quality to it just below the surface. It was a day most people spent discussing and considering the implications of the Islamic "*mujahedeen* government" that seems imminent in a city long ruled by secular, socialist regimes.

A merchant on Kabul's famed Chicken Street, where beer, liquor and imported food are abundant, simply slashed his forefinger across his throat when asked what will happen to his trade the day the *mujahedeen* come to power in the capital.

Abdul Qadir, who has been running his carnival ride in Babur's Gardens for the past year, also seemed deeply concerned. The crude, homemade merry-go-round, made of rickety iron, wobbly fan belts and an aging Russian engine, is a big personal investment, he said, an attempt to augment his meager government salary of 10,000 Afghanis per month (about \$12.50).

"I don't know," Qadir said, when asked whether the *mujahedeen* will shut down his ride. "I hope not.

It's nice for the children."

But when asked whether he is afraid to live under a government of Islamic rebels, Qadir added: "Yes, of course. I am a traffic policeman. And already, the salary is not enough for my family. It's not even enough for bread."

But over at the cockfight ring, there was much more optimism.

As the two birds chosen for the morning match pecked each other ferociously, with dozens of men screaming out wagers and odds and passing tens of thousands of Afghanis from hand to hand, one of the regime's technocrats concluded that the *mujahedeen* probably will not shut down the fights.

"It's tradition," said Mohammed Razaq Zada, the general director of the foreign department of the state-owned Bank of Afghanistan, who said he comes each week, as his father did for nearly 50 years, because he enjoys the action and the gambling.

Zada was asked whether he is concerned that a new Islamic-based leadership will change the nation's fundamental principles, including the banking system that has been his life.

"I'm not a political man," he said. "I'm a banking man. And the way I see it, maybe the persons in charge change, but the system will not change."

Suddenly, there were shouts. One of the birds had taken a large chunk of flesh out of the other.

"You see?" shouted an elderly man in a wool fez and sunglasses seated on the ground nearby. "Always fighting in Afghanistan."

But on the hillside overlooking the cockfights, one could see a far more dramatic image of the war that has already killed nearly 2 million people and maimed 2 million more. A 14-year-old boy named Sakhi was playing with his friends beside Babur's tomb. Their sport for the day was a practical one: shooting birds with homemade slingshots to augment their evening meal. But it was hard for Sakhi to join in.

He leaned on a battered old crutch as he explained that he had been a shepherd before his family was forced to flee the fighting in the Parwan Valley north of Kabul. He was walking with his sheep one day when he stepped on a land mine, one of the estimated 10 million mines strewn across the Afghan countryside. He lost his left leg. He was 11.

"No work," he said, when asked what he does all day. "No offers."

"I'm just here." APRIL 25, 1992

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES

On June 23, 1992, the ATLANTA JOURNAL/ATLANTA CONSTITUTION published a special report, WOMEN OF THE VEIL, written by Deborah Scroggins with photographs by Jean Shiffrin. Parts of the article were reprinted in the WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL on 7/26. We have reproduced the parts pertaining to Afghanistan.

By Deborah Scroggins

Cox News Service

ASADABAD, Afghanistan — There were women who broke the rules in this stronghold of Islamic freedom fighters.

One was a 14-year-old girl who six months ago refused to marry the man of her parents' choice. Her brother executed her with his Kalashnikov rifle.

Another was a teen-ager who recently ran away with a boy. Family elders took three days to track them down in the mountains. The boy's father shot his son in the head. The girl's father flogged her to death.

Toj Bibi whispers these tales sitting cross-legged on her floor. She has never broken the rules.

At the age of 30, Toj Bibi can count on one hand the number of times a year her husband permits her to leave the four mud walls surrounding his house. Only in his company. Even then, only to visit relatives, attend a wedding or go to a funeral.

She has never spoken to a man outside her immediate family. She has never seen the world outside her courtyard except through the 2-by-5 inch eyehole of mesh netting in the tent-like garment called a chadri that covers her from head to toe.

Toj Bibi has been pregnant nearly every year since she was married at 15. Six sons and four daughters survived. She fears her husband may take a second wife or even divorce her if she does not have more children.

She knows it is not like this for women everywhere. "But what can we do? These are our customs, our religion," she said. "We can only wait for death."

Until last month, the traditions that confine Toj Bibi did not have the force of law even in Afghanistan, one of the most remote countries in the world. In the capital, Kabul, women wore blue jeans. They went to school and held jobs alongside men.

But these small freedoms ended when Islamic rebels overthrew the Communist government after 14 years of civil war. The victorious guerrilla factions have agreed on only two things.

The first makes it a crime for women in Kabul to appear in public with any part of their body uncovered except their hands, feet and faces. The second makes Islam the law of the land.

In imposing their fundamentalist vision of Islam on women, the Afghan guerrillas are at the forefront of a political movement with ambitions far beyond the mountains of their country. . . .

Women's rights in the Middle East have always been intertwined with the issues of democracy and cultural identity. Like democracy itself, feminism grew out of a Western concept of human rights that is inimical to traditional Islamic political thinking. These rights were imposed in an effort to catch up with a historic enemy, the West.

The liberty of women is the first casualty in the Islamic counterrevolution. . . .

When Islamic governments come to power, dealing with "sexual anarchy" is much easier than coping with extremes of wealth and poverty, ethnic hatreds and illiteracy.

"Women divert attention from the real problems," said Hina Jilani, a Pakistani lawyer and human rights activist in Lahore, the ancient royal residence of India's Mogul conquerors.

As a result, women are losing legal rights in Islamic countries as rapidly as the rest of the world seems to be coming around to the notion that they ought to have more control over their lives.

Afghan customs increase deaths during childbirth

PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN

Armanalla was lucky. The feverish, 13-year-old new mother from rural Afghanistan, got a ride from her brother-in-law to Pakistan, where there are female doctors. Like most Afghan men, her husband would rather let her die than endure the shame of having a male doctor examine her.

"My husband let me come because of the lady doctors here," she said.

Armanalla stared straight ahead as she answered Dr. Suraya's questions in a timid whisper. The stick-thin girl mechanically rocked her little bundle of a baby. Long earrings jangled against her green printed veil.

Armanalla can expect to live 42 years, or less than the average woman anywhere else in the world. Though women in some other countries are poorer and have more children, they more readily receive medical care.

Rural Afghans believe Islam prohibits contact as intimate as a doctor's examination between unrelated men and women. Educated Islamic fundamentalists disagree, saying the Koran puts a higher priority on saving human life.

Armanalla was being examined at the Peshawar Mother and Child Health Clinic, one of only two Peshawar clinics for Afghan women.

Though hundreds of women travel to them daily from the most remote parts of Afghanistan, both the Mother and Child Health Clinic and the Afghan Obs/Gynae Hospital are on the verge of closing. They have no money for medicine, equipment and salaries now that international aid to the Afghan refugees has dried up.

Armanalla said her husband agreed to let her travel to the clinic with one of his brothers who was visiting relatives in the Kachigori refugee camp. The trip from her home to Peshawar takes between 14 and 20 hours, depending on the number of guerrilla checkpoints on the way.

Armanalla said she married her 20-year-old husband two years ago, when she was 11. Two months ago, she bore a son with the help of her mother-in-law on

the mud floor of her husband's house. She lost a lot of blood. Since then, she had had a high fever and a lot of pain.

Dr. Suraya, who uses no surname, said Armanalla had puerperal fever and prescribed antibiotics, vitamins and injections for anemia. But Armanalla was afraid her relatives would not buy the medicine for her.

If sex segregation is less deadly outside Afghanistan, it still has fatal consequences.

In a 1988 survey, the Population Reference Bureau found that, taken as a whole, people in Islamic countries have more children and die younger than in any other group of nations. The Washington-based group linked the high Islamic fertility and mortality rates to the low status of Muslim women.

WATCHING WOMEN DIE

Islamic doctors do not usually prescribe contraceptives to women without their husbands' permission. But Muslim men tend to demand family planning as their per capita income increases, the bureau reported. . . .

Toj Bibi, an Afghan mother of 10, said women in the town of Asadabad used to take "the medicine that stops babies" before the war. But the war destroyed the government clinics that used to distribute contraceptives. And so many men were killed that women feel it is their patriotic duty to have more children.

Dr. Nooraga Zahid, who used to work at a bullet-pocked clinic in Laghman province with a female doctor, said nowadays he is forced to watch helplessly as women die. "Childbirth is our biggest problem," he said with tears in his eyes.

Completely veiled women are allowed to describe their symptoms to him in the presence of their husbands.

Sometimes he guesses what is wrong with them. Mostly, he does not.

Dr. Maria Hamid said a survey showed that 63 percent of women in Wardak province, near the capital, had no help in childbirth. Another 12 percent went to a traditional midwife, 11 percent used religious charms, 5 percent

WOMEN OF THE VEIL

had a trained birth attendant, 7 percent saw a doctor, and 2 percent used some other method, she said.

Afghanul, a 42-year-old widow from Swati, a village of about 500 people, said her daughter-in-law died six months ago in childbirth before they could put her on a bus to Peshawar. Her infant grandson died 15 days later. Her son is already engaged to remarry.

"In this year, four or five [Swati] women died on the way," she said. "Some women died of birth, some died of diseases."

Amanollah, 30, said his 17-year-old wife, Guljan, had a close call last year with their 10-month-old daughter, Rena. He said Guljan spent 12 hours in labor on a minibus before reaching a female doctor in the town of Jalalabad.

"We are very worried about this. We want that there should be clinics," he said. "When she was sick, we had too much big problems."

PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN

The labor pains were coming sharp and fast. But Largana, a 19-year-old Afghan refugee, was crying out of joy.

"A son! A son!" she panted between contractions. "Thanks be to God."

After giving birth to three daughters, Largana had at last produced the Muslim woman's traditional ticket to status and power. In strict Islamic cultures, women gain honor most from their ability to bear boys.

Largana's ecstatic mother-in-law was already dancing with joy outside in the hallway of the Afghan Obs/Gynae Hospital. She planned to hold a party that afternoon for the newborn boy. And when Largana's husband heard the news, he would make the long trek from the fighting in Afghanistan to see his son.

If Largana had shamed them by bearing a fourth daughter, her family's response would have been very different.

While parents celebrate sons, they consider daughters at best auspicious fertility omens, at worst awful failures. These attitudes begin shaping the self-images of Muslim men and women from the very moment they are born.

"Most Afghan families are of the view that female childbirth is embarrassing and disgraceful," said Dr. Maria Hamid, who works in a nearby women's clinic. "The tragic life of a female child starts out with the shocked face of her mother. Gradually

Isolated Afghan women take comfort in families

SWATI, AFGHANISTAN

The world of women is a smaller, hotter place than the world of men.

For villagers like Sher Bibi, it amounts mostly to the harem, or the women's quarters of the house. Sher Bibi, about 50, entered her mother-in-law's harem at the age of 12, when she was married to a 20-year-old cousin. She left it for the first time 20 years later, when her mother-in-law died.

"I couldn't go out to the other families when my mother-in-law was alive," the grandmother recalls. "That was the custom of the villages."

Throughout the nations of the Islamic heartland, there are really two worlds: one for women and one for men.

In recent decades, the distinctions between these separate spheres have eased in many Muslim countries. Perhaps only Afghanistan, a living museum of traditional Islamic culture, has preserved them in their original stark segregation.

The compound in which Sher Bibi spent so many years measures about 7,000 square feet. Like all old-fashioned Islamic residences, it includes a courtyard surrounded by mud walls to shield the family women from prying eyes.

she finds out that she is no more than an unwanted guest."

Baby girls are least welcome in poor countries like Afghanistan. The reasons are mainly economic. An old woman in Samulina, a Pakistani village, summarized it this way: "If there's a girl, we have to give to her," said Hyatta Bibi. "If there's a boy, he will give to us."

Daughters leave the family to marry, while sons stay and support their parents. Women spend their lives bearing and raising children, while men can devote themselves to earning money. In countries without pensions or social security, old people without sons can be reduced to beggars.

The Koran explicitly prohibits female infanticide, common in many non-Islamic developing countries. But male children tend to get more attention and better nutrition.

The word harem comes from the Arabic *hareem*, which means "forbidden." Men from outside the family are forbidden to pass through the carved wooden door to the household.

Inside, Sher Bibi and her 12 sisters-in-law, daughters-in-law, nieces and granddaughters are always at work. All day, they scurry to bake bread, milk cows, stir stews on the fire, wash and mend clothes, scrub floors and beat handmade carpets, while children cling to their shawls.

When the men come home at night, Sher Bibi greets them with the same dignified courtesy she shows female visitors.

Sher Bibi cackles when she describes what she did after her mother-in-law died.

"I went every place," the withered old woman recalls gleefully. "I went to my family's house. I went to the house of my relatives. I went to my neighbor's house."

SHE MISSES OTHER WOMEN

Like most Afghan women, she does not aspire to socialize with unrelated men. What she missed locked up in the house was the company of women outside her husband's family.

Except for walking around the village, Sher Bibi has only crossed into the male world in a few grave emergencies.

Once was during the bombing of Charbagh, an ancient town a half-mile away, when the old men of Swati herded most of the women and children to safety in the city of Jalalabad. Another time her husband took her to Kabul to visit a female doctor.

Sher Bibi covered herself in a *chador* on these occasions. Waiting for the mini-bus, she sat behind a hill, hidden from the other, male passengers. Her husband stood on top of the hill, guarding her. If a bus conductor or a policeman stopped them, Sher Bibi would turn away or, if necessary, huddle to the ground.

The officials would studiously pretend the purple cloth apparition did not exist. Jealous Afghan husbands consider it a deadly insult for their wives even to be asked for a bus ticket.

Sher Bibi was impressed by the unveiled women she saw on the streets of Kabul. "In Kabul, every woman is free," she exclaimed just before the guerrilla takeover at the end of April.

A HAPPY MARRIAGE

But she does not complain about a life spent in *purdah*, or seclusion. Her husband's vigilant concern for her honor makes her feel cherished. She takes pride in the adobe house, the gorgeous carpets and the yellow songbirds he has given her.

Nor does Haji Atollah complain about a life spent working to pay for Sher Bibi to stay in *purdah*. He enjoys the order and discipline she has brought to his home. He adores the honest, respectful children she has raised.

A man's world basically encompasses everything outside other men's homes.

Before the civil war, Sher Bibi's husband, Haji Atollah, had a market stall in Charbagh. Sher Bibi's daughters-in-law never got to see Charbagh before a Soviet bomb flattened it a few years ago. Nor have they seen the bazaar beside a big road about a mile away where their brother sells gasoline now. Haji Atollah and his son do all the shopping.

Haji Atollah can read a newspaper, unlike his wife. Their three sons finished several years of university. The eldest son was killed in a tank battle two years ago and the middle son is believed to be in a Soviet prison camp. The youngest son dropped out to help support the family.

Their two daughters' schooling ended at the 6th grade. They live in their husbands' houses, so the parents see less of them.

Haji Atollah and his son, Amonallah, sometimes visit relatives or business associates in big towns or in Pakistan. Amonallah, 30, is gentle and introspective. Before his brother died, he had hoped to be a doctor.

Husband and wife say they never felt any real unhappiness until the war and the death of their eldest son.

Huge black-and-white portraits of the martyred and missing sons hang on the wall in their parlor. The whole family is moved to tears when the photographs are mentioned.

"We are Muslim, but the Communists didn't like Muslims," Sher Bibi said sadly. "For this, my son is dead."

Sher Bibi is positive her eldest son is in the garden of paradise. It is her only consolation.

After all, he died fighting to preserve the Islamic way of life.

هیچ گل بی خار نیست
"No rose is without thorns."

BOYS GO TO WAR

Syed Hassan, an Afghan health worker, was delighted to take his 5-year-old son, Shahen-shah, on a weeklong trip to an area where mortars boom regularly. He saw it as part of his responsibility to teach the boy many skills and values.

For his part, the boy did not whine or ask to go to the bathroom once during two crowded, hot car trips that each lasted more than 17 hours.

The boy's mother smothered him with hugs when his father brought him home.

"He is a good boy," she said. "He loves his father."

Generally, Afghan sons and

daughters are much more respectful of older relatives than many Western children.

Afghan children sit cross-legged for hours, silently listening to adults talk about the weather or politics. If Syed Hassan talked late into the night, his son would fall asleep on the carpet beside him without a sound.

In strict Islamic societies like Afghanistan and Pakistan, children and adults usually find their closest friends within the family.

Islamic morality dictates that there are few places outside the home where men and women can mix. Restaurants do not serve alcohol or are limited to men. Television and theater, where they exist, are censored.

bands' estates, after debts and bequests are paid.

After his brother was killed in an Afghan tank battle, Amonollah, 30, had to give up his medical studies to support his sister-in-law, Guljan, and her son and daughter. Now Amonollah sells gasoline in the bazaar near his village of Swati.

Guljan, 25, said remarriage is not socially acceptable in Sumita, but she is too heartbroken to think of it anyway. She said no other man would treat her as well as her dead husband. He was university-educated and did not mind if she visited neighboring women.

"I loved my husband too much," she said. "He loved me, too. I only care about my son now. All I want is for him to study in the future and become a good man like his father."

Last April, the Afghan town of Asadabad was preparing to celebrate the marriage of a 12-year-old boy to a 14-year-old girl. The boy groom had no brothers and eleven sisters. His father was sick. His mother arranged an early marriage because she needed grandsons to support her and her daughters.

But how could a boy raised in such a strictly segregated society know what was expected of him on the wedding night?

Toj Bibi, a relation of the groom's mother, said the mother sat down alone with her son a few days before the wedding.

Then, she said, the mother lifted her skirt and "showed her body" to the boy. The mother explained how the reproductive process works.

Once he understood, the groom was proud to be entrusted with such an important responsibility. Toj Bibi said he promised his mother he would deliver a grandson at the end of nine months.

Pakistani and Afghan men demanded pictures of themselves and their friends in every conceivable pose at home.

But, on the street, men were not so happy when Jean tried to photograph them.

One day in Peshawar, Pakistan, she tried to photograph an open-air bazaar where hundreds of men were buying fruits and vegetables. Jean and I were veiled. Still, they were so insulted that women were intruding into their male preserve that they chased us and our translator into the street, howling such lewd insults in the Pushto language that the translator burst into tears.

In Afghanistan, our male guides made Jean hide her camera whenever our truck passed through towns or guerrilla checkpoints.

She sent a post card with a picture of hooded women back to the newspaper from Pakistan. "Things are going fine," she wrote on the back. "I just can't take pictures of the women."

Before we left Pakistan for Afghanistan, Jean and I practiced walking around our hotel in the floor-length chadri.

Practice did not make perfect.

When we set off for Afghanistan at 4 a.m., I tripped several times just trying to climb into the truck under the masses of fabric.

The two sons of a mujaheddin general, the 10 armed guards and the 5-year-old boy who were escorting us could not stop teasing us about how clumsy we were when our eyes were covered with cloth.

I had to keep pulling the cap down to see anything at all out of the tiny mesh eyehole. When we stopped at a restaurant, the men had to lead us by hand to the storage room where women were allowed to eat.

Our translator was more sympathetic. She showed us how to pile the front of the chadri on top of our heads when the truck was in open country — and how to flap it down it down quickly if another car approached.

She told us how to act if, for example, the men stopped for tea in a bazaar or for a guerrilla inspection. Any time a strange man could see the truck, we were to turn away from the window and silently contemplate the pretty colors light makes as it filters through the chadri.

Once across the border in Afghanistan, in the village of Swati, we discovered one of the world's greenest valleys. Ancient stone irrigation channels carried water to fields of brilliant opium poppies.

The villagers showered hospitality on us, forcing us to eat four and five meals a day seated on blood-red carpets out of the Arabian nights. The dignity and the charm that Islam seems to lend men and women everywhere is nowhere more moving than in Afghanistan.

It was the Afghans' perfect confidence in the rightness of their Islamic culture that gave them the tenacity to bring a down a superpower technologically five centuries ahead. The Muslim faith gave them the awesome courage to stand on the tops of hills, year after year, firing automatic rifles at Soviet MiGs.

But I had to wonder if the reckless bravery of Afghan men is mixed up somehow with their absolute rule over women.

Wherever we went, Jean and I always wished Islamic women would ask us the questions we imagined they had about American women.

For example, we were eager to discuss why we were free to travel without our own male guardians. But we gathered that people were too polite to bring up the subject.

Then one night in a Swati house, a wizened old woman crept up out of the shadows to where we had been sitting on the floor with our hosts. She was missing most of her front teeth, but her eyes were bright with curiosity. She told one of our guards she wanted to know something about the two of us.

We were very excited.

Finally we would find out what this old woman, who had never seen a foreign woman before, had been thinking.

"Ahem!" coughed Syed

Hussein once he understood her question. "Er — do you two girls ever wrestle? This lady would like to take you on."

Grimacing encouragement, she pantomimed wrestlers struggling.



Widow left with little but grief

PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN

Salim Wasima was only 13 years old when her husband died in battle, but she can never marry again.

"My father-in-law won't agree," said Salim, placidly rocking her infant son. Her dark blond hair framed round, apple cheeks and a crooked grin. She is still young enough to stumble when she tries to walk underneath the long, turquoise, tent-like garment that marks her as an adult Afghan woman.

According to Afghan custom, Salim and her baby belong to her late husband's family. Her 17-year-old husband was killed in Afghanistan's civil war five months after their wedding, four months before the birth of their child.

Afghanistan, with its long war and its rigid code of honor, has more widows and puts more stringent restrictions on them than other Islamic countries.

But widows without grown sons to support them do not have an easy lot anywhere under Islamic law.

Outside Afghanistan, widows may remarry. But if they do, the deceased husband's family has the right to claim the children. Some parts of Afghanistan even maintain the Old Testament custom of marrying widows off to the brothers of their deceased husbands.

The Koran specifies that widows inherit half as much as widowers from their deceased spouses. Widows with children inherit one-eighth of their hus-

LETTERS

To the Editor:

I am one of your FORUM readers & enjoy the magazine. There are a few things that need to change so your magazine might be more readable & attractive to readers. * Now, about the situation in our country - you know, our people suffered long enough & they lost almost 2 million innocent human beings...

The world has forgotten the Afghan - they have turned their backs on us because there is no longer the Soviet Union - no longer the communist threat. For that reason their humanitarian assistance to Afghans has stopped.

I have sent a letter to the UN Sec'y Gen'l but no one even read my letter & I am enclosing a copy to be printed in your magazine:

Secretary-General
United Nations Secretariat,
New York, N.Y. 10021,

May 10, 1992

Your Excellency:

The people of Afghanistan are suffering. Will not United Nations step in to conduct an election which will settle for once the question of leadership?

I know their pain for I am an Afghan, although I now am living in the United States. I worry about my family back in Kabul. Will they survive? If they do, what will be their lives?

From the current newspapers I learn that the United Nations presence in Kabul is concerned greatly with giving asylum to former President Najibullah. It is my hope that this man, who has so offended his country and mine, will be turned over for trial. But besides this one man, there are many innocent Afghans who do not know what the next day, or the next hour, will bring.

United Nations was working to implement a peace, before the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif by Mahsoud which seemed to take the matter out of their hands. Please restore your efforts and help people who already have suffered enough.

Inshallah (God Willing).

Sincerely,

Yar Mohammed Kohsar



As an Afghan living in the US, I am asking the world's richest industrialized countries to step in & help our people in this very, very sensitive time of our history & save the lives of millions of Afghans. I am asking the UN Security Council to solve our problems & pursue their original plan, with modification, for the formation of a National Unity Gov't. We can't afford more blood, more destruction, just for the sake of power.

Why is the world no longer interested in the welfare & well being of our people? Do we no longer belong to the world society? We have endured enough. Now is the time to heal the wound & start to build the country & re-settle our unfortunate people.

Fourteen years is long enough to suffer, so once again a plea to the world & the UN to save our country & our People.

Sincerely,

* The "few things" weren't mentioned. [Ed.]

Yar M. Kohsar

We have one item from Bakhtar which we've saved since it appeared last October 9 (1991). It is a letter to then Prime Minister Khaliqyar from Abdul Majid Zabuli, a "former Minister of Economy of Afghanistan." We think it is still relevant.

"As you are well aware, I have dedicated most of my life to the progress & prosperity of Afghanistan. When I left home, I put a portion of my capital through government at the disposal of my compatriots.

"It is quite painful to me to see what I have accomplished being faced with destruction. I hope that Afghans get rid of this terrible war as soon as possible. The time is now ripe that the Afghans should assemble around each other and help solve their problem. The UN proposal made recently could be a good foundation for talks between the states concerned. Cessation of armed assistance and interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan could be a beginning to democratic movement. Transition of power through democratic principles are supported by the Afghans. The warring sides must forget the past and through concerted efforts must raise the ruined Afghanistan from the piles of dust again.

"Now that I am 95 years old, I wish nothing but termination of war in Afghanistan. I pray God the Almighty assist me to take part in the reconstruction of my beautiful country in the very near future."

ALL YOU NEED IS LOVE

...and faith, when you see
your fathers
throw themselves barehanded
against tanks
and fighter planes
and mighty cannons
that blow up entire villages
from great distances
even in the dark...

...and courage, when
your mother
is hungry
as she smiles through her tears.
her sunken eyes searching
for a ray of solace
through the ashes and gloom...


...and patience, whilst
superpowers
plot your future
pitting brother against brother
scorching Afghanistan
with their messengers
of destruction...

...and resolve, to show
dignity
in the face of adversity
and strength
to forgive
but never to give up
your birthright
for of what use
is life without honor...

...and imagination,
for all things pass
and the land
the laughter
and the abundance will return
if we never abandon
our dreams...

...and hope,
that humanity
has not forgotten
that happiness
is shallow unless
all share in it...

Rafi Ameer



Shish Kebab House Of Afghanistan

Good

360 Franklin Avenue (between Preston and Otis),
Hartford, 296-0301.

Atmosphere: In a free-standing building, a series of small, neat dining areas, simply but nicely decorated with Afghan and Indian artifacts and plantings.

Service: Accommodating and helpful.

Recommended dishes: Afghan pasta, mantoo, ashak, sultan's palow, beef shammi kebab, chicken shammi kebab, chicken kebab, lamb chops kebab, fernee, Afghan tea.

Price range: Lunch entrees \$6.95 to \$9.95, dinner entrees \$9.95 to \$14.95.

Credit cards: Mastercard and Visa.

Hours: 11:30 A.M. to 2 P.M. Monday through Friday, 5 to 10 P.M. Monday through Thursday, 5 to 11 P.M. Friday and Saturday. Closed Sunday.

Reservations: Accepted, recommended on weekends.
Wheelchair accessibility: Steps at entrance, restrooms at dining level.

By PATRICIA BROOKS

THOUGH Afghan food is unknown to many Americans, shish kebab is a staple in many places, so calling an Afghan restaurant in Hartford Shish Kebab House of Afghanistan is good marketing.

Diners have a choice of several quiet areas, each decorated attractively with Afghan artifacts and clusters of greenery. Under each glass-top table is a woven mat, and the entire look is simple but immaculate.

"What distinguishes Afghan cooking from Indian?" a guest asked the waiter on our first visit. "It's not as spicy," was his reply. And while this may be so, the dishes served at Shish Kebab House were extremely well seasoned and zingy enough for most palates. Some familiar Indian spices are also found in the Afghan kitchen — coriander, cumin, cardamom, ginger and garlic — but they take on a more delicate character. Samosas, Indian turnover-like appetizers of deep-fried dough filled with vegetables or ground meat, are similar to fried ravioli. The Afghan flat bread, called nan, differs from the Indian version; the Afghan is made with yeast, is heavier in texture and cut into squares.

At first glance, the menu (aside from the kebabs) looks exotic, with names like mantoo and ashak, but don't hold back. Every dish we sampled turned out to be extremely tasty.

One of our favorites was mantoo, listed under the category "noodle dinners," but we ordered it as an appetizer for two. It consisted of six dim sum-like steamed dumplings that had delicate skins filled with a fresh-tasting mixture of sautéed onion and ground beef. They were embellished with lentils and a dollop of tangy yogurt that was made on the premises.

Ashak, another noodle dish, was winning as well: it was a medley of boiled noodles, scallions, chopped spinach and spicy chopped beef (with a hint of coriander and other fragrant spices), topped with a combination of yellow split peas, tomato and onion lightly but deftly seasoned with garlic and coriander and served with a side vegetable. The vegetable side dishes, accompanying all entrees along with spinach-flecked rice or brown rice, were a choice of sweet pumpkin purée laced with tomatoes and cardamom or a tantalizing fire-charred eggplant (our preference).

Six kebabs are on the menu, all of them charcoal broiled on a grill on skewers (removed before serving). Each kebab dish had a certain zip and spicy intensity, because it was marinated in a blend of spices beforehand. The lamb chop kebab, vibrantly resonant with intense, yet not overpowering seasoning, consisted of two meaty and exceed-

Many Cultures Stirred the Stew

Now Najiba Ayubi Preserves Afghan Cuisine

By Candy Sagon

Special to the Washington Post

"Go on, try it."
"Naw, I don't think so."
"Pleeeez. It's delicious. You'll like it. Try it. Please?"
"No, I don't like that stuff."
"Oh, come on. It's my favorite. It's great."

"All right, all right. I'll try a little."

(Pause) "Well . . . ?"

(Grudgingly) "It is pretty good."

Would you believe that this was a conversation between two 12-year-olds? Over *eggplant*?

It's true. Sara Ayubi, whose mother, Najiba, had prepared a sumptuous Afghan dinner, was trying to convince her friend Sarah Sedaghatfar to try the pan-fried eggplant with tomatoes and garlicky yogurt sauce. A good 20 minutes of cajoling and wheedling finally did the trick. Sarah cut herself a small piece, ate it and pronounced it "pretty good," which coming from a kid is tantamount to getting four Michelin stars.

Granted, she didn't come back for more, but that's probably because both girls were full from their second and third helpings of Najiba Ayubi's spiced rice with julienne carrots, raisins, almonds and lamb chunks, and her irresistible meat-stuffed steamed dumplings. And, of course, they had to save room for a thick piece of honey-and-walnut baklava for dessert. . . .

ingly tender loin chops, served with light and fluffy spinach-flecked rice. The chicken breast kebab and chicken shammi kebab (ground chicken, well seasoned) were both equally fine entree choices.

But our favorite entree was not a kebab; it was sultan's palow, a mountainous pilaf of light, feathery basmati rice, lavish with raisins, almonds and carrot slivers, lightly but beautifully seasoned. Alongside the rice was a giant meatball made of gently, but authoritatively spiced, ground lamb.

We gravitated away from desserts like the commercial mud pie, raspberry chocolate cake and mocha-mousse cheesecake, and toward fernee, which proved to be a sparingly seasoned, rather bland milk pudding with cardamom and pistachios, plus ground pistachios as a garnish. One might opt for a serving of Afghan tea, an aromatic drink made with black tea, a soupçon of beet juice (which sounds odd but works), cardamom, sugar and milk. It was delicious and just sweet enough to satisfy as a dessert, as was the green tea, also scented with cardamom, a pleasing second choice.

Our dinner bill for two three-course meals came to \$37 before tax, tip and drinks. The wine list features 20 moderately priced wines, mostly Californian, but with a sampling from Australia, Chile and Italy. There are also two Indian beers available, which were our beverages of choice with Afghan food. ■

For Ayubi, who grew up in Afghanistan and lived briefly in Iran before moving to the United States 13 years ago, food is what strengthens a family's bonds. "Food is what brings people together. Our food requires a lot of work and time and after all that work, the women want everyone to come sit and eat," she explains.

Her husband, Taj, watching his wife stir a huge pot of spiced rice, agrees. "The food is so good, everybody runs to the table. It's real food, not something you grab and run, like a sandwich," he stresses.

For Najiba Ayubi, food is a comforting link to her homeland in a country that has provided both possibilities and problems for her and her family.

Since fleeing to the U.S. in 1979 from Iran, where Taj Ayubi was a co-editor of an English newspaper before the Shah was overthrown, the Ayubis have had both good and bad luck. On the good side, they had their third child, Sara (they also have a 19-year-old daughter, Senzel, and an 18-year-old son, Hakim), and they managed to purchase a comfortable home in Herndon. On the not-so-good side, they lost their savings in a bad business deal.

And then there's the matter of Northern Virginia's quirky streets and traffic patterns that still cause Najiba Ayubi to boil over with frustration.

"You drive in a lane that says you can go straight and all of a sudden it changes to left turn only," recalls Ayubi, still fuming at the incident that got her a ticket from an unsympathetic police officer.

On the other hand, this country does have its conveniences, like the ready-to-use won ton wrappers that she uses to make the ground beef-filled steamed dumplings called *mante*. "In my country, we didn't have such things. We had to make the dough by hand," she says.

Although her cooking has earned her a reputation here among her friends, she didn't do that much of it in Afghanistan, where other relatives and the family's hired cook performed most of the kitchen duties. Her parents encouraged her to attend college, and she graduated from Kabul University with a degree in child psychology and plans eventually to become a high school counselor.

"But I loved to learn about cooking," Ayubi remembers. "I would sit in

THE NEW YORK TIMES

MARCH 22, 1992

my parents' house and watch the cook."

When she and her husband and young children moved to Iran in 1974, she suddenly found herself responsible for doing all the cooking in a small apartment with a stove, but no oven.

"I made a big leg of lamb with yogurt and garlic and everyone was so surprised," she remembers with a chuckle. Her friends didn't know she could cook, let alone make something that usually needed an oven to turn out right. She, however, had remembered her mother's recipe and just adapted it to her new kitchen and a big pot.

In Afghanistan, she says, meals were big, hearty affairs with several courses. Breakfast, for instance, usually would include milk, fried eggs, bread, butter, cheese and walnuts. Lunch would feature a rice dish, soup, meat and vegetables, like okra or spinach. Then there would be tea served in the late afternoon with fruit, nuts and sweets, and dinner would follow with a meat dish, vegetable, salad and bread.

Even with all this food, "Afghan people are not fat because they walk a lot," she explains.

That much walking is impossible in this country, so Ayubi has scaled back her meals to some degree. She also works full time as a preschool teacher at a nearby child care center, which has cut into her cooking time.

Still, her love of good food and cooking has influenced her job. She supervises the preschool's menus and cooking, making sure that at least once a week the children, who range in age from 18 months to 5 years, get her popular Afghan chicken and rice dish. The recipe features chunks of chicken combined with rice, carrots, raisins and mild spices, all of which appeal to young palates.

She has also learned to make other kid favorites, like tacos, although she admits with a laugh that with the seasoning she uses, they're more like Afghan-style tacos.

She would like to write a cookbook some day and she has begun doing a small amount of catering, primarily selling her baklava, which she prepares in the preschool's professional kitchen.

On the evening that Sara and Sarah had their eggplant discussion, the dinner ended with generous pieces of her flaky baklava made with phyllo dough, crushed walnuts and sugar syrup.

When asked if Afghan baklava used honey, like the Greek version, or sugar syrup, like the Turkish kind, she smiled and said, "We compromise. We use a little of both."

To order Najiba Ayubi's baklava by

the half or whole sheet, call 703-435-4488.

LAMB AND RICE PILAU

(8 servings)

2 large onions, sliced
1/2 cup vegetable oil
2 pounds lamb, cubed
2 teaspoons salt
1/2 teaspoon ground cardamom
1/2 teaspoon black pepper
1/2 teaspoon ground cumin
1/2 teaspoon nutmeg
1/2 teaspoon cinnamon
4 cups Basmati rice, or regular long-grain rice
1 tablespoon sugar
4 large carrots, peeled and sliced into 2-inch julienne
8 ounces raisins
8 ounces slivered almonds

To make lamb: Cook sliced onion in 1/2 cup vegetable oil in a large saucepan until golden-colored. Add cubed lamb and cook until lamb is browned. Add 6 cups of water, salt, cardamom, black pepper, cumin, nutmeg and cinnamon; simmer for 30 minutes.

To make rice, fill a large pot with about 8 cups of water. Add rice and boil for about 10 minutes to precook. Do not let rice get too soft; it should still be firm. Drain and put the rice back in the pot. Set aside.

In another pot, add 2 tablespoons oil with 1 tablespoon sugar. Mix over high heat until mixture is dark brown. Add sugar mixture to lamb mixture and cook for an additional 2 minutes until well-blended. Remove lamb with slotted spoon and set aside. Add the mixture that remains in the pan to the rice and mix together gently until spices are evenly distributed and the color is uniform.

Place lamb on one side of pot containing rice. In a separate pan, sauté carrots, raisins and almonds together in 2 tablespoons oil until carrots are softened but still crisp and the almonds are golden. Add to other side of rice pot. Cover and bake in preheated 375-degree oven for 30 minutes.

To serve: Remove lamb from pot and set aside. Remove carrots, raisins and almonds and set aside. Remove half of the rice from pot and evenly distribute it on serving platter. Place lamb on the platter and then cover with remaining rice. Sprinkle with the carrots, raisins and almonds.

Per serving: 987 calories, 47 gm protein, 111 gm carbohydrates, 40 gm fat, 7 gm saturated fat, 106 mg cholesterol, 458 mg sodium.

EGGPLANT WITH TOMATOES AND YOGURT SAUCE

(6 servings)

1 1/2 pounds eggplant
Salt for eggplants and to taste
1/2 cup vegetable oil
3 tomatoes (1 chopped and 2 thinly sliced)
2 cloves of garlic
1/2 teaspoon ground coriander
1/2 cayenne pepper, to taste
Fresh cilantro for garnish
FOR THE YOGURT SAUCE:
2 cups plain yogurt
1 clove garlic, crushed
Salt to taste
1/2 teaspoon crushed dried mint

Peel and slice eggplants 1-inch thick and sprinkle with salt to draw out liquid. Let drain for 30 minutes, then rinse and pat dry. Fry eggplant slices in oil until golden brown on both sides. Remove with a slotted spoon and set aside.

Add the chopped tomato to remaining oil in pan along with 2 cloves finely minced garlic and salt, to taste. Cook gently until ingredients are softened.

Place fried eggplant slices in pan. Place some sliced tomato on top of each eggplant slice. Reduce heat to low. Sprinkle over ground coriander and cayenne. Cover and simmer for 5 to 10 minutes.

Meanwhile, combine all ingredients for yogurt sauce and set aside.

To serve, place eggplant and tomato sauce on serving plate. Spoon yogurt sauce over eggplant and garnish with fresh cilantro.

Per serving: 200 calories, 6 gm protein, 16 gm carbohydrates, 13 gm fat, 3 gm saturated fat, 5 mg cholesterol, 105 mg sodium.

The Washington Post

7/2



The Ayubis at dinner, from left, Taj, 12-year-old Sara, 18-year-old Hakim and Najiba.

BY BILL O'LEARY—THE WASH.

ORGANIZATIONS

TASK FORCE ON REHABILITATION AID TO AFGHANISTAN (TFORATA), c/o International Services, American Red Cross, Washington, D.C. 20006. A group of Washingtonians formed TFORATA to alert friends of Afghanistan to on-going rehabilitation efforts in Afghanistan & ways in which support can be channeled to support those efforts. TFORATA supports the rehabilitation work in Afghanistan being conducted under the auspices of the Int'l Committee of the Red Cross & the Int'l Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies. The Federation draws on its member societies for personnel, medical supplies & program support as requested by the indigenous society, in this case the Afghan Red Crescent which was created in 1934. TFORATA recommends 5 specific programs in Afghanistan:

The Orthopedic Facility in Kabul. The largest facility of its kind run by the ICRC with a patient capacity of 100. Patients are fitted with prostheses, crutches, wheelchairs, etc., & are trained to function as normally as possible. There are similar, smaller facilities in Herat, Mazar & Peshawar.

Dispensaries Program. The Federation provides personnel to staff 10 dispensaries in Afghanistan. These facilities provide both treatment & public health education, including hygiene, nutrition & vaccination. As of last June, these dispensaries were treating 30,000 patients per month.

Community-based Rehabilitation Program. Targeted to women & children, the objective of this program is to identify crippled children & treat, train & rehabilitate them. Afghan workers are now being trained to staff these programs although the program level is low due to a lack of funds.

Marastoon Home for Destitutes. Long under the aegis of the Afghan Red Crescent, the program protects & assists orphans, the blind, the indigent & the mentally ill. Many of its buildings were damaged during the war & need repair & modernization. New staff is needed also.

Assistance to Returnees Program. This program provides food & medical supplies for returning Afghan refugees.

Funds are also needed for fuel to permit vehicles to reach the needy population.

Donations to these programs should be made payable to THE AMERICAN RED CROSS; and FOR AFGHANISTAN should be written on the check. Donors may also specify which program should receive the funds. TFORATA will register the program interests of donors and will provide them with an annual accounting & other feedback. The American Red Cross will transfer the funds through Geneva to either the ICRC or the Federation account for Afghanistan. Donations are tax-deductible. The programs will also accept in-kind donations of appropriate medical supplies.

Mail donations, payable to the American Red Cross, to TFORATA, c/o Dr. Mimi Miran, Xerox Corporation, P.O. Box 2000, Leesburg, VA 22075.

For further information:

Returned PCVs & American Friends of Afghanistan - Betsy Amin-Arsala, 202-966-1040; Assns. of M.D.'s, Medical Companies, Orthopedic Service Groups & Pharmaceutical Companies - Nancy Cunningham, 404-875-1735; Afghans in America Groups - Mary Sameii - 202-358-8472; Corporate Contributions - Mimi Miran - 703-729-8000.

Afghanaid *UPDATE*

292 Pentonville Road, London N1 9NR

25.8.92

As you may have heard from recent media coverage, the security situation in Kabul has deteriorated, and, following heavy bombing of the city, the exodus of refugees from Afghanistan has restarted, thus reversing the repatriation of refugees from Pakistan that had gathered pace over the summer.

In spite of these unfortunate events, Afghanaid's projects in the country areas, which remain, for the most part, peaceful, are continuing as planned. The fighting in Kabul is making the supply of materials and equipment to the project sites much harder, but we are finding ways of overcoming these problems. New emergencies are arising all around us because of the disruption in Kabul and we are doing our best to help where we can.

Afghanaid's work is clearly that of reconstruction, but in the words of an Afghanaid engineer: "Cleaning canals sounds like rehabilitation: it is, in fact, emergency work: if canals are not cleaned this year, then people will die next year...because there will be no water for crop-planting next March. The need is massive. Running village-based programmes, Afghanaid is ideally placed to help. We have the trained staff, the experience, the established contacts, and good, efficient back-up. We could do even more with more funds".

Immigrant Students Get College Scholarships

By DeNeen L. Brown
Washington Post Staff Writer

The scholarship applications had a few typos and some misspelled words, and occasionally the English wasn't that smooth, but what the essays said—no matter how they were put down on paper—overwhelmed PTA scholarship committee members at JEB Stuart High School in Fairfax County. . . .

"My father died when I was very young," wrote Tue Minh Ly, a 17-year-old senior. "My mother was murdered in Vietnam five years ago. Therefore I have no parents or any benefactor to support my future education. . . . Please help me make my dream come true."

Ly's essay, along with almost two dozen similar stories from immigrant seniors, so moved PTA officials last spring that they raised funds to nearly double the amount of scholarship money available.

Now Ly and 18 other June graduates of the ethnically diverse high school in Baileys Crossroads are getting ready to do what few thought they ever could: go to college.

After members of the school's PTA went to English classes last year to tell students about the scholarships the group offers based on need, they received a flood of applications. Most were from students who had arrived in this country recently, carrying with them memories of death and famine to go along with new burdens of working to pay rent and survive. They were asking for help making it in this country.

The applications told more than individual stories. They told of an increasing need among immigrant students for help to go beyond high school, according to Ann Marie Hicks, co-chairman of the JEB Stuart Community Scholarship Fund, which was established at the school six years ago. . . .

Although the ~~scholarships~~ are not large—they range from \$100 to \$600—in some cases they cover one semester at Northern Virginia Community College, and in others they cover the gap between aid already offered students from college sources and what their parents can afford.

Scholarships from community groups, such as JEB Stuart's PTA, have become an important source of college money for students in many localities. One of this area's best established funds, the seven-year-old Alexandria Scholarship Fund, is giving \$92,000 this academic year to more than 110 graduates of T.C. Williams High School, according to Kitty Porterfield, director of the fund.

Porterfield said that because the number of immigrant students is

growing in Alexandria, much of the money goes to them. "A big chunk of that is students new to this country," she said. "Dollars follow the percentages in the school population."

Because some of Stuart's foreign-born students are here illegally, providing financial aid for them is somewhat controversial, said Jones Jones, Stuart's guidance director.

Although the courts have said all immigrant children, legal or not, must be educated through grade 12, "society doesn't say what's to happen to them then. It's a moral question and a political question," Jones said.

To qualify for federal college aid, a student must legally reside in this country, but the PTA grants have gone to students regardless of their immigration status, according to Hicks.

Most of the scholarship winners said they are anxious about their ability to succeed in college. And, given their fragile financial situation, even with scholarships, many worry that they won't be able to afford to finish college. . . .

Jenna Habibi, 19, said she is thankful for the scholarship, which she said will help pay for her books at Northern Virginia Community College, where she plans to study medical technology. She said her family left all they had when they fled Afghanistan. Now her parents, who are sick, cannot work to help her pay for college.

"I'm going to college to get a good career and a good job," Habibi said. "It's very important for my family to have an education. If you don't have an education, you are nothing to people." WP 8/23



Jenna Habibi

BY JAMES A. PARCELL—THE WASHINGTON POST

Refugee cabbie stabbed

Samin Salim fled Soviet soldiers in his native Afghanistan only to be stabbed to death, possibly in a family dispute, as he was driving a cab in Queens Saturday night.

"Like everyone else, he left northern Afghanistan during the war with Russia," said a friend outside Salim's Flushing, Queens, home. "And now he's dead."

Neither the friend nor a man identified as Salim's brother would discuss any other details of the 22-year-old cab driver's life or death.

Salim was stabbed two times in the shoulder about 9 p.m. Saturday by a passenger who was in the rear of his yellow cab on 161st Street in Flushing, police said.

Salim ran out of the cab, and the assailant followed, catching him and stabbing him six times in the chest, according to police. Salim staggered back to his cab where he died, police said.

The suspect fled in a light blue station wagon that was parked behind Salim's cab, police said, adding that an accomplice was behind the wheel.


Police said that the stabbing may have been a "possible family-related dispute," without elaborating further.

Police ruled out robbery as a motive because they found \$197 in cash in Salim's pocket.

Salim, who moved to the United States five years ago, and his brother owned the cab and shared driving duties, police said.

— Alfred Lubrano and Russell Ben-Ali

NEWSDAY (Long Island) 7/20



Citadel - Herat

Afghans hurry home

GENEVA (Reuters) — Refugees are returning to Afghanistan so fast that United Nations relief workers have almost run out of funds and emergency food supplies, an official of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said yesterday. "It's happening much faster than anyone expected. We're incredibly short of cash," said Sylvana Foa. On Sunday, a record 16,000 people crossed into Afghanistan.

The swift return is good news in one respect — the world's biggest refugee population, around 6 million people, or 30 per cent of all refugees world-wide, is finally starting to go home. But the UN needs funds to help them set up a new existence back home.

Independent (San Antonio)
no date

THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 8TH 1992

In what appeared to be a racist attack, an Afghan refugee was beaten to death by a gang of youths in London.

TAMAROV



• Self portrait by VLADISLAV TAMAROV

A Russian soldier smuggled a camera to the front in Afghanistan. In his searing memoir, he says he writes of what he cannot speak.

By JOHN BOUDREAU
SPECIAL TO THE TIMES

SAN FRANCISCO—Vladislav Tamarov stares down a street lined with upscale art galleries and restaurants. He lights a cigarette that will burn to a nub. Then he will have another and another. "I was drafted at 19," he remarks. "I felt this was bad, and I was right."

The 27-year-old Russian photographer has traveled far from Afghanistan, where he left his youth on the battlefields.

In December, 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. On Aug. 10, 1984, Tamarov arrived in Kabul to begin his two-year tour of duty. Kept in ignorance of the ferocity of the war—as were most Soviet citizens—he thought he was going to build hospitals and plant trees.

He found himself in a mine-sweeping unit. He was stationed there for 621 days, patrolling the mountains.

Now Tamarov stands on a sidewalk in front of a San Francisco gallery where his pictures from his life as a soldier are on display. He has just published a memoir, "Afghanistan: Soviet Vietnam," based on his war diaries and filled with his pictures of fresh-faced Soviet soldiers at the front.

Tamarov's book is probably the first that looks at the Afghanistan war from the view of a "grunt," says Thomas Christensen, executive editor at Mercury House, a small San Francisco publisher that has printed 7,500 copies of "Afghanistan: Soviet Vietnam."

While in the army, Tamarov secretly photographed whatever he saw around him with a cheap camera. He rigged up a darkroom at his base camp and made prints for his comrades. Some officers permitted his photography, though his government forbade it.

When he returned to Leningrad, he read news accounts of victorious Soviet soldiers; there was nothing of what he had seen. Tamarov made a futile attempt to tell his story in the Soviet press.

Frustrated, he began to write: "On our base, where instead of resting between combat missions, we practiced marching in formation. On our base, where the ones who took orders never returned, while the medals went to those who gave the

orders. On our base, where kind people were transformed into vicious ones. Where the vicious became cruel. Where they made boys into murderers. For what?"

Tamarov spent five years writing his manuscript, drawing from notes he kept in Afghanistan, conversations with American veterans about Vietnam and visions of fallen comrades who revisit him in dreams.

In one photograph, his close friend, Sasha walks through tall grass, an automatic in one hand, his smooth boyish face looking into the camera. It was taken just before a combat mission, and Tamarov made a quick print so his friend could send it to his family. Twelve hours later, Sasha died in an ambush.



"When he was killed, I had no problem killing," Tamarov says. "I had a mission of anger. This was real anger. . . . Take aim to kill, to kill, to kill, to kill. And I was 20. This was a dangerous game to play, and who survives is who kills first. In this game, the prize is the chance to play again."

As he goes back to his days as a soldier, Tamarov chokes up, then apologizes. He says he writes of what he cannot speak.

Of Tamarov's book, "if you substitute the word Vietnam for Afghanistan, you'd be reading about American veterans 20 years ago," says Jack McCloskey, who was a medic in Vietnam and helped establish the veterans' service group Sworn to Blowshares. He first met Tamarov several years ago when the Russian visited the United States with a delegation of Afghanistans.

"He feels a strong kinship to Vietnam veterans," says Vietnam veteran John Messmore, who lives in Virginia and is Tamarov's friend. "He knows what we went through and he wants the American public to know that it was the same for the Russian soldier."

It was the American Vietnam veterans he met during exchange delegations who inspired him to tell his story, Tamarov says. "At first, we had trouble with the language. But we understood each other without interpreters. Sometimes you can look into someone's eyes and understand everything. We received more understanding from Americans than we did from our friends at home."

"I learned that everything was

the same. In any foreign war, you go because you are drafted. You're not stopping anything. You're just killing people."

The Americans brought to Russia practical information about post-traumatic stress syndrome, advice on organizing veterans' groups and lobbying for benefits and examples of advances in prosthetics.

"In some ways, they have it worse," says U.S. veteran Messmore, who traveled with the first group of Vietnam veterans to the Soviet Union in 1988. "If you lost your arm and leg because of the war, you are doomed to being hidden in your family's home. You become an embarrassment."

The early meetings between decades-old enemies, American and Soviet veterans, had tense beginnings: "We were in some body's home, and everybody was drinking, smoking. After a couple of drinks, one Afghanistan veteran from Moscow, who had had a real bad concussion, his hearing was bad, said, 'I get this because of you American rocket.' Tamarov says, 'And this person he was talking to, pulls up his pant leg and shows that he has a prosthesis. And he said, 'But this I got from a Russian rocket.' After that, there was no problem. They were best friends."

Tamarov flew up to Leningrad, now St. Petersburg—and has spent off and on about two years in the United States and plans to remain here through next spring, staying with people he met through the veterans' exchange programs.

He says he is impelled only to tell what he saw, heard, and tasted in Afghanistan. The soldier is uncomfortable when he sees his original prints, pictures of his buddies, selling for \$850 a copy in the art gallery.

He wants to use his book profits to self-publish his story in Russia. He hopes his story will help his people understand what Afghan veterans experienced and make it easier for them to get psychological and medical care.

Mercury House is not funding a book tour, so Tamarov plans to spend the next year—at his own expense—traveling across the country. He is negotiating to get his prints shown in other cities. Eladio J. Ballester, co-director of Lee & Lees Contemporary Inc. in San Francisco, which displayed Tamarov's work, believes it will not have wide popularity.

"There is a segment of society that will have a hard time with this because it's about war," says Ballester, a Vietnam vet. "And it's not a glorious thing; it's about the waste of human life. People don't want to be reminded. He's making a political statement, and bringing a much clearer view about what the other side was about. Some of us would like to keep thinking the Russians are all bad people."

Tamarov, who fought vigorously against the U.S.-supplied *mujahideen*, is not bitter: "This book is not about war; it is about people, me, my friends. Sometimes when

people talk about war, they forget the people. You can talk about policy, politics and all this kind of stuff, but the most important are people. It's not just words and pictures. I tried to make people feel my way, how I felt in this world, how my friends felt in this world."

"I do not think this book is for veterans," he says. "It's for people who do not know anything about war."

Vietnam veteran Messmore says the book is something parents should give their children: "What scares me is that in America we now have an image of war that is the Persian Gulf. It's cool again to run around and play G.I. Joe. I don't know if these kids will be able to question [their government]."

In the art gallery, Tamarov looks at one of his prints. Two fawn-eyed recruits who could pass for twins stand harmlessly, arms resting lazily on their weapons, a swarm of helicopters behind them. They were 19, but hardly look old enough to drive. Forty minutes later, they were in battle.

"I saw them fighting, and there was a strange feeling about that," Tamarov says. "Their young faces, automatics in their hands, and they are fighting to kill. Something's wrong with this picture, I thought."

He stops to pull on his cigarette. "But I didn't see my face when I was fighting," he finally says. "Maybe I had the same face. I was young also."



LOS ANGELES TIMES

JULY 21, 1992

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

NEGLIGENCE AND CHAOS, Bibliographical Access to Persian-Language Materials in the United States by Farideh Tehrani, 1991, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, NJ 08840. 256 pp., charts. ISBN 0-8108-2473-6. \$29.50.

Tehrani believes that American libraries have invested large sums of money to acquire Persian-language materials, but that their inadequate transliteration and cataloging systems have made these materials inaccessible to users. This has resulted in an unfortunate and inexcusable waste. The author proposes a simple script conversion method which uses practically no diacritical marks.

INVENTING INDIA, A History of India in English-Language Fiction by Ralph J. Crane, 1992, St. Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. 228 pp. ISBN 0-312-06820-4. \$49.95.

The WORLD SURVEY OF ISLAMIC MANUSCRIPTS, Vol. I, Afghanistan Iran, General Editor, Geoffrey Roper. Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Fda. E.J. Brill, 24 Hudson Street, Kinderhook, NY 12106. 544 pp. ISBN 1-873992-01-7. \$143. The Survey aims to provide the reader with a guide to collections of Islamic manuscripts, details of access to these collections & their holdings, plus information about particularly significant manuscripts which they contain. [Volumes 2 & 3 are scheduled for publication in 1993.]

Also from Brill:

Fasicule 127-128 of THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, paper, \$37.25. There is a simultaneous French edition; it costs \$43. and

TIMURID ART AND CULTURE, Iran & Central Asia in the 15th Century, edited by Lisa Golombek & Maria Subtelny, 1992. viii + 208 pp., 128 illus. ISBN 90-04-09531-4. \$68.75. Contains edited versions of 19 papers presented at a symposium on the subject held in Toronto in November, 1989.

THE BEAR TRAP: AFGHANISTAN'S UNTOLD STORY by Moh'd Yousaf & Mark Adkin, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1992. 243 pp., photos, maps.

FROM KABUL TO MANAGUA: Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s by Fred Halliday, 1989, Pantheon Books. 198 pp., appendix, biblio. ISBN 0-394-57310-2. \$12.95 (paper)

HAIN-UL WOQAHI: HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN DURING 1787-1904, in Farsi, by Moh'd Yosuf Riazi Herawai, Tehran Univ., Tehran, 1990. 286 pp.

A STUDY OF THE EARLIEST COINAGE OF THE ISLAMIC EMPIRE, in Farsi, by A. Shams Eshrag, Istak Co., Isfahan, 1990, 230 pp., photos, tables, map.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN THE TERRITORY OF AHMAD SHAH MASSUD (NORTHEAST AFGHANISTAN), in German, by Alexander J. Clausen, Univ. of Salzburg, Faculty of Arts & Sciences, Austria, 1992. 159 pp.


BASHEER-UL-MOMENAT is a quarterly published by the Afghan Women's Resource Center in Peshawar. It contains English translations of articles selected from the monthly Dari/Pashtu publication of the same name. Vol. 1, issue 2, Feb.-April, 1992 had 20 pages. Subscriptions are \$25/year for institutions (\$20 for individuals) & are available from AWRC, UPO Box 1421, University Town, Peshawar Pakistan. Bank Acct. # 113-14-01807-001, Grindlays Bank, Peshawar.

AFGHANISTAN: TRENDS & PROSPECTS FOR REFUGEE REPATRIATION, a report published by the Refugee Policy Group, 1424 16th St., NW, Suite 401, Washington, DC 20036. April 1992. 62 pp., \$10.50.

The latest reports in the AGRICULTURAL SURVEY OF AFGHANISTAN, sponsored by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in Peshawar, include the 13th report, "Repatriation & Rehabilitation Survey, Part 1, Khost Area, Paktia," May 1992 & "Part 2, Khogiani Area, Nangarhar," May 1992; the 14th report, "1991 Survey," June 1992; & the 15th report, "Farming Systems of Nejrab District, Kapisa Province," June 1992.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

"The Kart Dynasty of Herat: Religion & Politics in Medieval Iran." Lawrence Potter from Columbia University, May 1992.



Rob Schultheis' *Night Letters* is a hair-raising account of his adventures as a freelance war correspondent in Afghanistan.

'Such brave people'

Coloradan draws from travels in Afghanistan for 'Night Letters'

Rocky Mountain News July 5, 1992

By Margaret Carlin
Rocky Mountain News Books Editor

It's difficult for most Americans, with their convenient, well-stocked supermarkets, slick shopping centers and garages stuffed with horsepower, to imagine life in primitive Afghanistan.



Schultheis

with the exotic culture of that mountainous and still unsettled country.

Schultheis first experienced Afghanistan in 1972, stopping briefly on his way to India to study for his doctorate in anthropology. Even then, years before the Christmas Eve 1979 Soviet invasion beamed the world's spotlight on Afghanistan, the area captivated the writer as a "strange, paradoxical, complex little country."

"It's still like going inside a time warp," Schultheis says by phone from his Telluride home, "these are a medieval people. They wear turbans and floppy shirts. Their women are veiled. They believe the Earth is flat.

They laugh a lot, even in times of great danger. They live in one of the harshest environments on earth, so they use humor to survive. I just fell in love with the place and the people."

He describes the Afghans as "tall, handsome, strong," and "hard, hard as sand, but their hardness conceals a kernel of fey tenderness deep inside." He agrees with a description from British historian Robert Byron: "Hawk-eyed and eagle-beaked, the swarthy, loose-knit men swing along the bazaars with a devil-may-care confidence."

Schultheis's love for that primitive country and its dauntless people is reflected in his latest book, *Night Letters: Inside War-torn Afghanistan* (Crown, 155 pages, \$18), a hair-raising account of journalistic adventures in that country. He's also the author of *Bone Games* (Random, 1985), a physical and spiritual study of endurance.

"I've been in Afghanistan 20 times altogether, three times before the war," he says. He went on to cover the war for TV and many national magazines, and describes numerous close calls. He traveled with the Afghans, who were fighting with bolt-action rifles, swords, scythes, stones — whatever they could lay their hands on — against tanks, radar, helicopter gunships and other sophisticated weaponry.

Night Letters helps explain how the Afghan fighters eventually

triumphed. Their resistance to the Soviet invasion was relentless — even teen-agers were guerrillas: "They were kids, really, but their eyes were 10,000 years old, and their smiles had a way of chilling out around the corners and fading away from you till they were as distant as the polar snows of Mars."

Schultheis takes the reader inside the bazaars and tea shops, shows you the Afghan women, who "appeared in public in the guise of ghosts, *afreets*, clad in the head-to-toe shrouds called *burkhas*, with a woven grillwork over the face."

He recounts how it feels to be under fire; how it feels to have dengue fever, called breakbone fever for its agonizing pain ("I floated in and out of a haze of unknowing and uncaring, unable to move"); how it feels to walk in blood-filled shoes in incredible heat; in short, how it feels to be an American trying to understand and record someone else's war.

Will Schultheis return to Afghanistan? He quotes a CBS cameraman in the book: "When you go up into those mountains with those people (mujahedin), you leave a piece of your soul up there, and you have to go back and find yourself from time to time."

His answer is, "someday." Three months ago, he married fellow wilderness brother Nancy Craft, a weaver and former

teacher of English in Japan. The two traveled to Nepal to be married by the High Lama in a Buddhist monastery on the route up Mount Everest.

"For a long time, I've dreamed of helping to set up a national park system in Afghanistan to promote tourism. The country is fabulously beautiful with places where snow leopards, wolves, monkeys, tigers still can be found. The leaders in Kabul now are some of the guerrillas I traveled with during the war. They're my friends, so as soon as things settle, I really want to return."

In the meantime, Schultheis is enjoying the beauty of Telluride — hiking, rafting, running, especially running. "I'm doing two-hour runs to train for the Imogene Run — that's the 18-mile course over 12,800-foot Imogene Pass."

Toward the end of the year, he plans to accompany a surgeon friend to Burma to work in a relief hospital there. In the meantime, he's writing a script of *Night Letters* for Longfellow Films, and is happy that the book is being translated into Afghanistan's native tongue (Pushtu) for distribution there.

"The title pays tribute to brave people, many of them women, who posted anonymous urgent broadsheets called *Night Letters* around Kabul during the war. Such brave people."

When Empires Collide

THE GREAT GAME

The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia.
By Peter Hopkirk.
Illustrated. \$65 pp. New York:
Kodansha International. \$30.

By Byron Farwell

THE British have a penchant for describing warfare and diplomacy in terms of games, so it seems only natural that the 19th-century contest for power between the expanding British and Russian empires played out on the vast expanse of central Asia should be called the Great Game. Although made famous in 1901 by Rudyard Kipling in "Kim" ("Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing the Great Game"), the expression was coined by Arthur Conolly, himself one of the players, who in 1842 was tortured and beheaded by the Khan of Bokhara.

Mile by mile, while the British watched apprehensively, the Russians conquered the string of khanates and tribes stretching across the region and dreamed of leading their armies through the mountain passes and down into the plains of India. In "The Great Game," Peter Hopkirk, a British journalist and the author of three other books on Asia, describes vividly the contested lands and cities whose very names conjure up mystery, romance and high adventure: Tashkent, Samarkand, Bokhara, Kokand and Khiva. The game was played amid lofty mountains and in deserts where barbarous tribesmen were ruled by emirs who knew neither morality nor mercy, and whose knowledge of the great world was so limited that one of them believed Britain was a tributary state of Kashmir.

Beginning with the stories of Henry Pottinger and Charles Christie, who in 1810 traveled in disguise among Afghanistan's hostile tribesmen and across its comfortless deserts, and closing with the story of Francis Younghusband's expeditions into Tibet nearly a century later, Mr. Hopkirk relates with verve the history of the Great Game through the lives of more than 100 of these adventurers, many of whom met unpleasant deaths.

The unfortunate Conolly was only one of the daring young officers who penetrated the region. Some were sent by their governments; others ventured on their own. In that era, travel in dangerous and sensitive areas, although often prohibited, rarely inhibited individual enterprise. The explorers drew maps, found strategic passes and gathered economic, military and

Byron Farwell's books include the recently published "Armies of the Raj: From the Great Indian Mutiny to Independence, 1858-1947" and the forthcoming "Stonewall: A Biography of Lieut. General Thomas J. Stonewall."

Inside the Royal Yurt

[The Russian officer Nikolai] Muravev received a summons to appear before the Khan that evening. Putting on his full dress uniform (he had been advised that it would be a breach of etiquette to wear his sword), he set out for the palace preceded by men armed with heavy sticks who brutally cleared a way through the crowds. Making his way past Khiva's great tiled mosques and *madrassas*, its covered bazaars and bathhouses, he finally reached the main palace gateway. Entering, he crossed three courtyards, in the first of which were waiting 60 envoys from the surrounding regions who had come to pay their respects to the Khan. Eventually he was led down some steps and found himself in a fourth courtyard. In the middle of this, somewhat incongruously, stood the royal yurt — the circular tent of Central Asia. Seated in the entrance, cross-legged on a beautiful Persian rug, was the Khan himself.

Then, just as Muravev was hesitating over how he should approach the Khan, he suddenly found himself seized from behind by a man in a

political intelligence. In the "shadowy struggle for political ascendancy," Mr. Hopkirk says, the line "between exploration and intelligence-gathering was often extremely narrow."

One of the most extraordinary adventures was that of Richmond Shakespear, the very personification of British pluck and diplomacy. In 1840 he set off from Herat in western Afghanistan for Khiva, 800 miles away, pushing his way through rugged country where Turkmen raiders habitually captured and enslaved subjects of the czar. His purpose was to forestall the Russians by inducing the Khan of Khiva, a man not easily swayed by humanitarian feelings, to free the Russian slaves in his territory, thus depriving the Russians of a reason to attack.

dirty sheepskin coat. For a split second he feared he had been tricked. "The thought flashed through my mind that I was betrayed," he wrote, "and that I had been brought here unarmed, not for negotiation, but for execution." He shook himself free and prepared to fight for his life. But hastily it was explained to him that this was an ancient Khivan custom, and that all envoys were dragged before the Khan as a sign of voluntary submission. Muravev now advanced across the courtyard toward the yurt, halting at the entrance and saluting the Khan in the local fashion. He then remained standing, waiting to be addressed. "The Khan," he reports later, "has a very striking appearance. He must be six feet high. . . . His beard is short and red, his voice pleasant, and he speaks distinctly, fluently and with dignity."

After stroking his beard for several minutes and studying the Russian carefully, the Khan at last spoke. "Envoy," he enquired, "wherefore art thou come, and what dost thou wish of me?"

From "The Great Game"



Afghan riflemen said to be friendly to the British.

Incidentally, Shakespear succeeded, and 416 men, women and children were released to him. When one mother protested that two of her children were still being held captive, Shakespear begged the Khan in his palace and badgered him into giving them up, although one was a beautiful 9-year-old girl obviously destined for the Khan's harem. Six months after leaving Herat, Shakespear arrived at the Russian frontier with his freed slaves — and valuable intelligence.

When the 19th century began, some 2,000 miles separated British- and Russian-controlled lands. But Russian expansion in the region ultimately encompassed territory equal to more than half that of the United States, and by the end of the Great Game only 20 miles separated British and Russian outposts in a remote corner of the Himalayas. The obstacle to further expansion was Afghanistan, which proved to be unconquerable by either the British or the Russians.

Mr. Hopkirk wastes no time shaking his head over the evils of imperialism. His tales are told with obvious relish and straightforward admiration for those stalwarts who, firm in their patriotism, their muscular Christianity and their belief in the clear superiority of Western civilization, entertained no doubts about themselves or their deeds. The besieged at Chitral, Mr. Hopkirk writes, were "a handful of British officers, with their loyal native troops, holding out against overwhelming odds in a remote and picturesque fortress." Stonehearted Gen. William Nott, in the First Afghan War, was "ready and eager to march on against ever-elusive Elphinstone's humiliating defeat . . . and the countless soldiers and families who had perished on the death march." Mr. Hopkirk even dares to speak of "Oriental treachery."

There may be scholars who will fuss over some vagueness as to dates, some imprecise military titles, and some fuzzy mileage and casualty figures. No matter. Those who enjoy vividly told tales of derring-do and seek a clear understanding of the history of the emerging central Asian countries with exotic names will find this a glorious book.

NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

9/13

The Grail at the End of the Pass

AN AFGHANISTAN PICTURE SHOW

Or, How I Saved the World

By William T. Vollmann

(Farrar Straus & Giroux: \$22; 268 pp.)

Reviewed by William McGowan

In his introduction to a 1984 fiction collection, "Slow Learner," Thomas Pynchon admitted that he had been jarred by reading stories he had written more than 20 years earlier. At first, the pretension and goofiness of his efforts made him want to gag and call *rewrites*. But up on a mood of middle-aged tranquility, he settled into an acceptance of the younger writer he once was. "I mean, I can't just very well 86 the guy from my life," he explained. "On the other hand, if through some as yet undeveloped technology I were to run into him today, how comfortable would I feel about lending him money, or for that matter even stepping down to the street to have a beer and talk over the old times?"

A similar ambivalence informs William Vollmann's latest work of nonfiction, "An Afghanistan Picture Show: Or, How I Saved the World." But Vollmann does his younger self one better than lending him money or buying him a beer. A successful novelist now in his 30s, Vollmann helps a character based on his 22-year-old self, the "Young Man," find meaning in the experiences he had on a journey to war-besieged Afghanistan in the early 1980s. As described by the Young Man, the goals of that trip were vague; to comprehend what had happened to the country as a result of the Soviet invasion and to help the Afghani people "In the Best Possible Way." Not surprisingly, the younger Vollmann became overwhelmed by massive suffering he felt unable to ameliorate.

Vollmann's book is a kind of "Pilgrim's Progress" highlighting the dizzying moral ambiguities that naïfs like him find in the Third World. The narrative action stretches over the course of several months, chronicling Vollmann's "adventure" and his residence in Peshawar on Pakistan's northwestern frontier. Again and again Vollmann tries to get into Afghanistan itself—the Grail he seeks, lying just over the Khyber Pass. While waiting for his contacts in the *mujahideen* to take him there, he busies himself in the bazaars and refugee camps of Peshawar, trying to learn all he can about the Afghani's plight. This information, the Young Man explains, will be included in "An Afghanistan Picture Show," a photo exhibit he plans to create back in the States to raise funds for the Afghani cause.

Vollmann's fund-raising efforts were in the end ludicrously unsuccessful. One night, the money he collected from a presentation at Berkeley did not even cover the amount the university charged him for the room.

The Young Man obviously takes his mission to Save Afghanistan very seriously, asking earnest questions of relief officials in order to see the Big Picture and to decide which resistance organizations merit his help. "If only he could go tomorrow," he says at one point. "Then he could accomplish something. Then he could accomplish something that much sooner." For all his earnest urgency, Vollmann wryly concedes, the Young Man is actually a well-meaning but essentially ineffectual stumblebum who can do little but sulk and flagellate himself as his Good Aims and High Purpose dissolve in a puddle of intestinal disease and cross-cultural bewilderment.

In the end, it is Vollmann who becomes the burden, always on the receiving end of the Afghani's generosity. Sick with dysentery, sedated by the heat and hamstrung by his own youthful rigidities, he

and injury, he was becoming more and more like his own picture of these people whom he thought to save. It was he who was lost, questioning, thirsty and ever so far from his own land.

Vollmann the elder also pokes fun at the Young Man's penchant for tying himself in the knots of tendentious questions. Although he is clearly anti-Soviet, the academic

side of him is willing to wonder whether the Russian occupation might have some lurking progressive content in the long run. Could the homogeneity that Soviet expansionism encourages be a source of world peace, since so many of the world's conflicts were ignited by too much cultural heterogeneity? And was it worth saving Afghanistan, as history suggested, it was only going to be invaded again in the long run? Yet such imponderables did the Young Man no harm, we are told, since he was the kind of person who never abandoned a project he had begun even if something convinced him he was wrong.

While the Young Man is Vollmann's only fully drawn character, the aggregate portrait he paints of refugee existence in Peshawar is vivid and complex. Vollmann has come to bear witness to the plight of the Afghani, but he does not sentimentalize them. He writes honestly, for instance, about the pervasive corruption in relief operations, the culturally exaggerated expectations of refugees who think America is a land of girlfriend apartments and Cadillac just waiting for them; and cultural attitudes he finds unsettling.

Especially disturbing to Vollmann is the Afghani's treatment of women. "A camel or a water buffalo is valued more than a woman in this society," a nurse in the camps tells him. "You can't get a husband to donate blood for his wife because if you take his blood you take his life, but if she dies he can always get another wife."

At first the Young Man sees the rebels romantically—"storybook De Gaulles," he calls them. Very quickly, though, he learns of the revenge cults, the murderous paranoia, the kidnapping and the lying that taint the *mujahideen* cause. "If a man were to switch political parties he would be killed," one of Vollmann's sources tells him. "If my informant's party were to find out he told you this, he would be killed" adds the source. Still, despite the backstabbing and factional intrigue, Vollmann can agree with an Afghani professor who thought factionalism was unfortunate "but did not ethically prejudice the whole."

The best writing in the book comes in a section chronicling Vollmann's long-awaited passage over the border into Afghanistan. In addition to capturing the austere beauty of the landscape—which in the orange evening light "resembled a photo of Mars"—Vollmann conveys the frightening, almost otherworldly joy of the *mujahideen* as they fight against Soviet troops in "a series of endless night moments of happiness near death, no fear in them as I honestly believe;

they had crossed their river so long ago that I could not really comprehend them as anything except heroes."

Regrettably, though, Vollmann's accomplishments are tarnished in several substantial ways. His characteristic incoherence with language can make sentences sound intriguing, but just as often makes them cryptic or confusing; e.g., "It is part of the fragmentation of life that after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan I wanted to go there."

There are also too many nuggets from the philosopher Wittgenstein strewn throughout the book, while some are appropriate (especially the ones questioning the ability of one human being to comprehend the inner feelings of another—a leitmotif of the book), the majority stop the forward motion of the narrative with pseudo-metaphysics.

Vollmann's structure is also problematic. As befits its title, the book is written in fragmentary, snapshot style, ranging back and forth over time and topography. Sometimes the crosscuts work and make for powerful juxtaposition. But as often they are disjointed, affected and self-absorbed.

Vollmann also has a penchant for digressive flights of fancy, à la Pynchon. In fact, in one instance he even compares a song about "good old Peshawar" similar to the comic ones that punctuated "Gravity's Rainbow." (The song is funny, but clearly a rip-off.) In another instance, while in the middle of his otherwise gripping account of the battle inside Afghanistan, he sees a wooden airplane one of the guerrillas had strung up in the camp and digresses for several pages about the plane's lost wooden pilot and his fate as he wanders

behind enemy lines. All too cute, the tangent nearly smothered a scene which is essentially Vollmann's climax.

The book's most significant shortcoming, though, is Vollmann's failure to explain how he became so crazed about helping the Afghans beyond blind "save the world" humanitarianism in the first place. The question is significant: Since we are not told why he wants so desperately to help, we cannot empathize with his failure.

At one point he alludes to the death of his sister, who drowned, he says, because "I hadn't paid attention." Is this to mean that he has been burdened with a lifelong "rescue complex" because of his perceived irresponsibility? Is this accident his personal *Patna*, the ship that Lord Jim abandoned in Joseph Conrad's novel, consigning his passengers to certain death? And why does he choose to save Afghanistan, over any number of other stricken countries? Besides his personal motivation, Vollmann also leaves unexamined why Westerners in general are so ready to relieve "exotic distress" in such faraway places like Afghanistan.

Despite its unevenness and unexplained assumptions, however, "An Afghanistan Picture Show" is a bold and original accomplishment, hardly the "Failed Pilgrim's Progress" that Vollmann deridedly calls it. For all his humanitarian determination and effort, Vollmann's Young Man may not have relieved the suffering of any Afghani. But in his honest accounts of their plight, and his morally and emotionally complicated reactions to it, Vollmann the elder has written a powerful, searching addition to the literature of personal witness.

LOS ANGELES TIMES BOOK REVIEW
7/19
McGowan's "Only Men Is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka" was published this spring by Farrar Straus & Giroux.



Bloody-faced mujahideen rebel after days of fighting Afghanistan's army.

President Rabbani outlines program of Islamic State

Prof. Rabbani, the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, has said that providing security and maintaining of law and order are the main points of his agenda.

Speaking on TV and radio after the transfer of power, he said forming a unified army from the ranks of Mujahideen and professional officers was a key to achieving stability. He also announced the dissolution of all paramilitary forces formed by the previous regime.

The Islamic government, he stated, would observe the rights of all Afghan nationalities, particularly with regard to the army's ranks and within other state organs.

The Islamic State, continued the president, would take necessary steps to make sure that the people -- and especially Kabul residents -- are safe from insecurity and anarchy; and that every individual's life, property, honor and dignity are safeguarded. He added that the plan for providing security in Kabul has been prepared and will be announced soon.

Although the general amnesty remains in force, said the president, adventurists who continue to commit sabotage and create disorder must be punished.

He said that protecting the gains of Jihad, propagating the message of Islam, implementing Islam in all dimensions of the society's life, consolidating the Islamic State and the preservation of national unity were his government's primary responsibilities.

Respect for human dignity and the people's natural rights were among the pillars of his domestic policy, he continued, and added that the people's participation in electing the national leadership was the most basic element of the Islamic political system.

He said the Islamic State would try earnestly to increase the supply of basic commodities in the market, prevent hoarding, and control prices of goods.

Stressing the need for reconstruction, Prof. Rabbani asked the people to take keen interest in rebuilding Afghanistan, and called on friendly countries to give all possible support towards achieving this.

There is, he added, a need to rebuild our towns and villages on modern lines, taking into account the commercial, educational, health and recreational needs of the population.

Prof. Rabbani committed the Islamic State to paying special attention to reviving and developing agriculture during reconstruction, so that the country would become self-sufficient in food production in the near future.

The Islamic government would promote and guarantee domestic and foreign investment, said Prof. Rabbani, who called such investment a significant step towards industrial development.

The president asked all Afghan scholars, scientists, engineers, physicians, and experts who live abroad to respond to the needs of their Islamic homeland and fulfill their religious duty by participating in Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Prof. Rabbani announced that the Islamic State would launch a comprehensive campaign against the cultivation, production, trafficking and use of narcotics and other intoxicants. The government would also take measures for the treatment of drug addicts, he said.

He hoped that the United Nations and friendly countries would help Afghans to fulfill this humane goal by providing financial and technical assistance for implementation of the program.

Prof. Rabbani stressed the need for Islamization of the educational system and said that Islamic subjects will be treated as the essential element of school curricula. The Islamic State will abolish from school books those materials found to be against Islamic principles.

He said the Islamic State intended to reform the women's educational system, in order to acquaint women with the essentials of knowledge and culture in accordance with the needs of Afghanistan's Islamic society. Women will enjoy all the rights and privileges endowed them under the teachings of Islam, he added.

Prof. Rabbani said he respected freedom of expression, within the framework of the Islamic Sharia, and considered it necessary for society's intellectual growth.

Prof. Rabbani stated that Afghanistan's foreign policy would be based on protecting and promoting national interests, consolidating independence and national sovereignty, defense of territorial integrity, preservation of

world peace and security, elevating Afghanistan's prestige within the international community, and ensuring the welfare and tranquility the society of mankind.

The Islamic State, he continued, respected the United Nations charter, the International Declaration of Human Rights and all other established principles and norms of international law which are consistent with Islamic principles.

He said Afghanistan would play an active role in the non-aligned movement and in the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Prof. Rabbani said the Islamic State would support the rights of Palestinians and added that it supports the solution of the Kashmir problem on the basis of UN resolutions. Afghanistan would support the struggles of the Muslims of Burma, the Philippines and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He thanked Afghanistan's two Islamic neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, for the help they had rendered to Afghanistan's Muslims during the past 14 years. He also expressed his gratitude to all other Muslim countries -- particularly Saudi Arabia -- who strongly supported the Jihad.

The president also thanked the US, China, Japan and western European countries for supporting the Afghan struggle.

Prof. Rabbani rebuked the government of India for not supporting the just cause of Afghans during Soviet occupation of their country. But he added that Afghanistan stood ready nevertheless to establish good relations with India, which is a member of the non-aligned movement and has a large Muslim population.

He said Afghanistan was keen to establish friendly relations with the newly independent Central Asian Muslim republics; and expressed confidence that friendship between the Islamic State of Afghanistan and neighboring Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan would result in the growth of commercial, economic and cultural ties.

Prof. Rabbani said Afghanistan was ready to normalize its relations with Russia, but added that Moscow, as the legal heir of the former Soviet Union, should help rebuild Afghanistan as well as paying war reparations.

OBEDIENCE

Verse: "Men have authority over women because God has made the one superior to the other. and because they spend their wealth to maintain them. As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them and send them to beds apart and beat them." (Sura 4:34)

Law: Women must obey their husbands. Men have a right to punish disobedient wives. Men have a legal duty to support women financially.

DIVORCE

Verse: "Those that renounce their wives on oath must wait four months. If they change their minds, God is forgiving and merciful; but if they decide to divorce them, know that God hears all and knows all." (Sura 2:226)

Law: A man may divorce his wife anytime, for any reason, by saying "I divorce you" three times. If he wants custody of the children, he gets it after the age of puberty and sometimes earlier. Only a court can grant a woman divorce. She must be able to prove that her husband has mistreated or deserted her.

Wisconsin State Journal

7/26

See article on p. 23.

AFGHAN GAS LURES NEW CUSTOMERS

Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to form a joint commission to study ways of cooperations between the two countries in different fields. A protocol in this regard was signed by Minister of Plan of Afghanistan, Mohammad Ali Javid and Minister of Economic Affairs of Pakistan, Sarraj Aziz in Islamabad.

Pakistan has agreed to survey the reconstruction of Jalalabad-Kabul road within six weeks and draw a plan for repairing the road within months.

A Pakistani team will also study the possibility of extending a gas pipeline from the Northern Afghanistan to Pakistan. Extension of the pipeline will enable Afghanistan to sell its natural gas for the much needed hard currency. Extension of such a pipeline could also bring gas to Kabul which facing severe fuel shortage. Afghan gas was sold to the former Soviet Union at a very cheap price. The flow of gas to Soviet Union was stopped after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989. Tajikistan has also shown interest in buying Afghan gas in return for selling electricity to Afghanistan.

AFGHANews 7/15

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS



EXCERPTS FROM THE STATEMENT OF USTAD ABDUL SABOOR FARID,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN

Press Release No. 92/04

Kabul, July 13, 1992

JULY 25, 1992

Creation of brotherhood, trust and unity among the Jahadi parties would result to the formation of a powerful government in the Islamic State of Afghanistan. This was stated by Abdul Saboor Farid, Prime Minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, while speaking on the platform of his government made public by the Afghan radio-television last night.

We would like to state here that strict attention will be given to the nation's unity, independence and territorial integrity and resolute struggle will be made against all regional, racial, ethnic and language discrimination here, he said.

The Afghan Government will do its best to maintain peace and security in the Afghan capital and other provinces of the country, he added. We are well aware that as a result of the 14 years of war, the economy of the country collapsed, the war and the wrong communistic economic policy hampered production and distribution of goods to the people and resulted in the expansion of corruption.

Agriculture and animal husbandry have suffered much, abandoning of the agricultural areas by the cultivators, bombardments, disruption of irrigational system lack of chemical fertilizer, medicines for animal and plant diseases, sowing seeds, drought and floods have put their adverse and destructive effects on the agricultural system too, he went on to say.

In order to cope with these factors, we are to draw up strict economic plans based on the Islamic principles aimed to establish an independent national economy in the country. Maintaining good relations with the friendly and Muslim countries to attract economic assistance in the areas of agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, commerce, transport, communications is essential. Such an aim could be fulfilled through the cooperation and endeavours of the people, he stressed.

We will try to increase revenue sources of the country and maintain a logical balance between the revenues and expenditures of Afghanistan. Also, a strict financing system will be introduced in the country. Keen attention will be given in the increment of the agricultural outputs, reclamation of land for agricultural purposes, reactivation of the Agricultural Development Bank, repairing of the head dams, canals, underground canals, launching of encouraging publicity programmes and handicrafts. The assets kept by private persons, companies and parties must be utilized. Everything must be economized, he emphasized.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan will defend women's rights as specified by the sacred Islam religion. The Islamic State of Afghanistan will focus keen attention on the education of the womanfolk here. Women must use their veils as a stronghold for the protection of their honour and prestige, he added.

Our country is in need of an all-sided rehabilitation. To attain this goal, we must maintain internal security, create unity among the individuals, groups, and people's strata. Finally, attraction of financial and technical assistance of the friendly and Muslim countries will play important part in this field, he said.

Clearance and elimination of ideas and actions committed by the previous regimes and appointment of competent people to the government posts will bring a good reform in the government offices, he went on. As our internal policy, our foreign policy is also based on the ideology of revolution. This ideology guarantees our national prestige, territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of other countries.

Good neighbourly ties and maintaining of good relations with those countries who assisted us during the Jihad, non-participation into the military blocs form a part of our foreign policy. We support struggles of the Kashmiris, Philippine and Burmese Muslims, Palestinian and Yugoslavian Muslims too, Farid said.

Our relations in the international arena is based on friendly footings and peaceful co-existence. We will further consolidate our active membership with the Non-aligned Movement. We will preserve our good relations with the brotherly neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Iran who supported and assisted us and our Afghan refugees during the Jihad. We will maintain brotherly relations with Saudi Arabia who supported our nation during the Jihad as well, Farid concluded.

Judiciary case studied



Rabani

Leadership council meets

A seminar sponsored by the officials of the supreme court and the related central courts was held on June 30 to study the present and past situations of the courts in the conference hall of the supreme court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Mawlawi Abdullah Fazlul Bari, Secretary of Jahadi Council and acting President of the supreme court, Mawlawi Abdul Satar Sediqi and Mir Azizulhaq Zafiri and Sayed Noorullah Muran members of the supreme court, heads of the divans and courts of the supreme court and judges of the appeal court of Kabul city and province attended this seminar.

Mawlawi Zamen Ali Behsoudi head of the commercial divan of the supreme court explained the situation of the courts in the last 14 years.

Specifying the grave tasks of the judges, the acting president of the supreme court said that judges should implement the Islamic Sharia and realize the lofty objectives of the judiciary system of the Islamic Revolution.

Mawlawi Abdul Satar Sediqi spoke on ways a judge must work and the performances of judges in the light of the Islamic Sharia.

At the end the problems and proposals of the judges were submitted to the secretariat of the supreme court for necessary actions. (BIA)

KT 7/8

صبر تلخ است
لکن بر شیرین است
Patience is
bitter, but
its fruit is
sweet.

Presided over by esteemed Ustad Rabani. Chairman of the Leadership Council and Head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, a meeting of the Leadership Council was held on Monday. Secretary and spokesman of the Council, Mohammad Asef Muhseni told BIA correspondent that among the issues the council discussed the main were questioned the new flag of Afghanistan to be designed in black, white and green from bottom to the top horizontally, bearing the words "Allahu Akbar" and the holy creed in full. The emblem was decided to be chosen later.

Esteemed Muhseni said that the session decided an economic council should be formed of the concerned ministers and a number of the economists headed by Ustad Burhanuddin Rabani, head of the state to deal with the country's economy. Moreover, it was decided that head of the state should call the lecturers and administrative body of Kabul University to discuss its reformation.

Delegations were resolved to be dispatched to the provinces to coordinate the affairs and to maintain their relation with the capital. Necessary decisions were adopted on how to call back the Afghan children now in the former Soviet republics (BIA)

KT 7/8

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Press Release No. 92/05

JULY 29, 1992

A high-ranking delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran headed by His Excellency Alawouddin Brojardy, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, paid an official visit to Kabul for three days, from 26-29 July 1992.

The delegation was welcomed and warmly received by high-ranking authorities of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran met with His Excellency Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, Chairman of the Leadership Council and President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

During this meeting, the Iranian delegation congratulated Professor Rabbani on the victory of the Muslim mujahed people of Afghanistan and congratulated Professor Rabbani on his election as President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and on behalf of the esteemed President of Iran invited him to pay a friendly visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Reciprocally, the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan expressed his thanks for the assistance and support of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the 14 years of Afghan people's Jihad, the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan accepted with pleasure the invitation to visit Tehran. It was decided that the date of the visit would be announced in the very near future. During their visit to Kabul, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran also met on separate meetings with Ahmad Shah Masood, the Minister of Defence of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Mohammad Asef Mohseni, Secretary and Spokesman of the Leadership Council, and Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, member of the Leadership Council of Afghanistan and discussed matters of mutual interests.

The first official and working meeting between the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and His Excellency Sayed Solaiman Gailani, Acting Foreign Minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan took place on July 26, 1992. Only July 27, the specialists of both countries organizing three special committees achieved the following agreements through the establishment of three working committees on sphere of joint cooperation, struggle against narcotics, return of refugees, medical treatment and health issues and communication.

1) For the further expansion and consolidation of relations in various political, economic and cultural fields, the two sides agreed to organize, after evaluation and adoption, an Afghan-Iranian joint cooperation committee in the very near future. The committee will outline the dimensions and mechanisms of cooperation and submit it to their respective governments for adoption.

2) The cooperation between the border cities of Afghanistan and Iran can take place only in the framework of Afghan-Iran joint cooperation committee.

Observation

The current agreements between Herat and Farah provinces and (Eston Khorasan of Iran) would continue and after the adoption of the above-mentioned agreements, article (1) will be corresponded to the new agreements.

3) The two sides consented in principle to establish small joint border markets in the framework of article 1 of above-mentioned agreements.

The place and procedure of the small markets will be proposed to the respective governments by both countries' specialists for adoption as soon as possible. The two sides agreed to accelerate the establishment of tripartite committees composed of Afghanistan, Iran and the UN on the return of refugees from Iran to their country.

4) Both sides seriously emphasized on the joint cooperation on struggle against production, distribution and transportation of narcotic drugs and consented to establish a joint committee for this purpose.

5) In sphere of health and medical treatment, the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed their readiness to train Afghan health personnel. The Islamic Republic of Iran also pledged some assistance on providing medicine, reconstruction of buildings and hospitals in Afghanistan. It was also agreed that for the purpose of expansion of mutual cooperation, the Minister of Public Health of Afghanistan will visit Tehran.

6) On the sphere of the post and communication, the two sides consented on mutual cooperation between the field of communication. The Iranian side declared his readiness to provide the Afghan side with the scientific training and vocational assistance on post and communication. The Iranian side also expressed its readiness to cooperate with the transmission of Afghanistan's post channels to and from other countries through the Islamic Republic of Iran.

'Rambo' in,

KABUL, Afghanistan — Laiya Khan isn't fond of wearing scarves. She likes the feel of the wind through her hair. So when she came to work yesterday morning bundled in baggy clothes, her head shrouded in red cloth, colleagues giggled.

Khan laughed back. There across from her in the international news division of the Bakhtar news agency was M. Katawazi, her boss.

Just two weeks ago, he sported a suit. Now he wore a cream-colored shalwar kameez, a pajama-like outfit favored in Islamic countries.

"Look at this," said Katawazi. "Are we really becoming a Muslim nation?"

Ten days into the establishment of the Islamic republic of Afghanistan, daily life has become confusing. Everyone is guessing what is right and what is wrong.

The government has issued a few orders to guide its people. Effective yesterday, it banned the consumption and sale of alcohol and ordered women to wear 'Islamic dress,' which means only the hands and face may be shown in public. Failure to obey is punishable by flogging.

Still, in this society not prone to fundamentalism, anomalies remain.

At the Khyber playhouse, the city's biggest movie theater, "Rambo III" is the current blockbuster. Every show is sold out, says Besmullah Khan, the 47-year-old director of the theater.

"It's an Islamic movie," Khan says with a straight face. "Rambo kills Russians. And he fights with the mujahedeen." The Cold War-era film shows Rambo with the "freedom fighters" who now dominate Kabul. Next in line, however, is "Robocop II."

"Oh, that one's OK," Khan said, fingering large stacks of local currency after an early-morning show. "It's a technical movie. It has lots of science."

The only thing the Ministry of Culture has banned, he said, is sex. That means no more Indian movies, which — with their inevitable scenes of smooching under waterfalls — have been a favorite among Afghans.

alcohol out in new Islamic republic



5/9
ASBURY PARK PRESS

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN COMMITTEE, P.O. Box 18, Westmont, IL 60559. 312-465-4963. Now in its 9th year, HRAC has concentrated its assistance efforts on refugees in Pakistan & the US. Now the organization is looking forward to extending its support into Afghanistan, using the following criteria for the selection of worthwhile efforts. Groups it chooses must support reconstruction or provide aid to refugees, be sponsored by recognized NGOs (Afghan & other), & have stable & qualified leadership & staff. In addition, HRAC is devoted to supporting the interests of refugees in the Chicago area.

HRAC's affiliated organization is the AFGHAN WOMEN'S TASK FORCE, 1864 Sherman, 7 NW, Evanston, IL 60201. 708-475-7839. The AWTf was formed in 1988 & charged by HRAC to undertake activities to benefit refugee women - especially in Pakistan. Project 1 was to assist Lycee Malalai, a girl's high school in Peshawar. The Task Force donated books, teaching aids & a TV/VCR unit & cassettes. By mid-1990, the Lycee became independent of the Int'l Rescue Committee & reportedly was in satisfactory financial shape under local leadership.

Project 2 was the Women's University, overseen in part by the Asia Foundation. The Task Force has made cash grants & book donations to the university, which reports that 340 students are currently enrolled studying medicine, science, literature, Islam & education. The university hopes to relocate in Afghanistan as soon as the political situation stabilizes. The AWTf will continue its support.

Project 3 is the Afghan Women's Resource Center which is closely linked to the Int'l Rescue Committee's women's education programs and is aimed at "enabling women to support their families & increase their potential contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan." "We shall continue to help the Center whether it sets up activities cross-border or remains in Peshawar." Contributions to HRAC &/or AWTf are tax deductible. Annual membership in each organization is \$20.



AFGHAN WOMEN'S INFORMATION NETWORK, c/o Shirlee Taraki, 1864 Sherman Ave., #7NW, Evanston, IL 60201.

"From time to time, members of the Afghan Women's Task Force [see previous article] are called upon to identify persons who have expertise & experience relating to Afghan women. We expect such requests may increase..." The Afghan Women's Task Force proposes to act as a clearinghouse for information about such persons.

If you would like to be included in the NETWORK, send a copy of your resume to Shirlee Taraki at the above address. The NETWORK would also be grateful for copies of any articles, chapters, etc., pertaining to Afghan women. NETWORKers are encouraged to join the Task Force, but membership is not mandatory.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFGHAN PROFESSIONALS (OAP) was recently founded in the Washington, DC area. The contact person is Ali Asghar Danish, 6015 Chicory Place, Alexandria, VA 22310. [We'll hope to have more on this one in a later issue.]


WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN, c/o Int'l Rescue Committee, 386 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016.

The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children is the only organization in the United States whose mission is to speak on behalf of the 14 million women and children around the world who have been forced to flee from their homes because of war, civil strife, famine or persecution. It was founded in 1989 under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee, the leading United States private voluntary agency assisting refugees worldwide.

To become a member or receive additional information, please write:

Mary Anne Schwalbe,
Staff Director

The Commission's initial overseas delegation was the catalyst in establishing the first Afghan Women's Social Service Center in Peshawar, Pakistan. Dr. Cynthia Haq, an Assistant Professor of Family Medicine at the University of Wisconsin, headed the delegation to Pakistan in 1989. Her recommendations led to the Center's development, and she revisited the area in 1991.



Commission members regularly testify before Congress and present their findings to U.S. State Department policy makers, United Nations officials, and other governments. They write letters and articles, appear on television and radio, brief the media, and give speeches to advocate on behalf of refugee women and children.

Afghan women in health class

THE AFGHANISTAN RESISTANCE RELIEF CENTER, P.O. Box 507, Annandale, VA 22003, USA, sponsors the AFGHAN CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL in Peshawar. In June, founders Dana, Rodney & Russty Rawding went into Afghanistan for the first time.

"...In Jalalabad, we were warmly greeted by the Governor & other newly elected members of the local gov't. We were delighted to hear that ACH would be given rent-free use of a 200-bed hospital, which was built by the US before the Soviet invasion, & is adjacent to the University of Jalalabad. The communists vacated the city 6 weeks before we visited the area. The Mujahideen 'eviction notices' were evident on many surrounding...buildings, but the hospital was left untouched.

"Upon inspection, we found that it will take only a little time to clean, repaint & repair various minor problems, for the building is basically in excellent condition. In the 2 years ACH has been in Peshawar, 152,349 children have been treated. With the extra beds that are already in this new hospital, we will be able to alleviate the severe crowding we face in the medical ward (2, sometimes 3, kids in 1 bed) & will shorten the waiting time for those scheduled for surgery."

The Rawdings plan to start slowly in order to make their financial resources go as far as possible until the time comes when they can turn the hospital over to a fully functioning Afghan gov't. They hoped to open the Jalalabad facility this fall. The UN may assist with donations of medicine & medical equipment. Contributions are tax deductible.



Refugee Policy Group

Afghanistan

At the request of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCA), RPG undertook a preliminary study of the situation of internally displaced persons in Afghanistan. RPG's report submitted to UNOCA in November 1991, reveals that the majority of Afghanistan's internally displaced population has integrated into local communities, and their needs are not very different from those of the rest of the country's population, most of whom have suffered the effects of a decade of war. RPG recommends that in Afghanistan assistance be directed at particularly vulnerable communities rather than at specific populations based on their migration status.

1424 16th Street, N.W., Suite 401
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone 202-387-3015 • Fax 202-667-5034

Columbia University's CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CENTRAL ASIA is now headed by Barnett Rubin, Associate Professor of Political Science, 1129 Int'l Affairs Bldg, 420 West 118th St., New York, NY 10027.

The CENTER promotes & coordinates courses & programs on the 5 former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan & Turkmenistan, as well as Afghanistan & the western parts of China & Mongolia.

Aside from regular courses on the area & a brown bag seminar series, there will be a special seminar this autumn with the primary purpose of preparing graduate students for participation in a research project entitled "The Emerging State System in Central Asia: Ethnicity & Islam," directed by Professors Rubin, Edward Allworth & Richard Bulliet. This project involves travel to Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan. It is funded by the United States Institute of Peace.

Women under VEILING Islamic law

Islamic law or sharia is derived from the teachings of the Koran, the customary practices of the Prophet, Islamic holy men and the traditions of the communities where Islam became dominant. Here are some of the Koranic verses concerning women and the way they have been interpreted in Islamic law.

Source: The Koran, translated by M.J. Dawood. (Penguin Books, London, 1990.)

(See p. 23.)

Verse: "Enjoin believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their chastity; to cover their adornments (except such as are normally displayed); to draw their veils over their bosoms and not to reveal their finery except to their husbands, their fathers, their sons, their stepsons, their brothers, their brother's sons, their sister's sons, their women servants, and their slave girls; male attendants lacking in natural vigor and children who have no carnal knowledge of women." (Sura 24:31)

Law: Interpretations of this verse differ. The most traditional view is that women should not reveal more than their face, hands, and feet to men outside their immediate family.

LAWS ABOUT WOMEN

Verse: "Prophet, why do you prohibit that which God has made lawful to you, in seeking to please your wives?" (Sura 66:1)

Law: Some religious leaders use this verse to emphasize that rights of men over women as outlined in the Koran cannot be abridged. In this view, it is impossible under Muslim law to outlaw polygamy, reform divorce laws or prohibit wife-beating.

Wisconsin State Journal

July 26, 1992

CHRONOLOGY

7/6 - The Independent (San Antonio) - In Delhi, near the Afghan Embassy, Sikhs staged a mock funeral for Rabbani to protest recent attacks on Sikhs & Hindus in Afghanistan.

7/15 - AFGHANews (Jamiat) - The Leadership Council has adopted a tricolor flag for the Islamic state of Afghanistan. The colors, from bottom to top, are black, white & green. The words "Allah-o-Akbar" (God is great) are on the top; "La Elaha Ellallah, Mohammad Rasool-ullah" (there is no God but Allah, Mohammad is the Prophet of Allah) is inscribed in the middle. The state seal will be chosen later. [For more items from this issue, see pgs. 17, 36]

7/20 - NYT - Iranian-backed rebels & pro-Gov't forces fought rocket & artillery duels, killing about 60 people & injuring 300. Since April, nearly 2,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed & wounded & scores of homes & shops have been destroyed. "We are the new refugees," said 20-year-old Ahmed Sediq as he and his family abandoned their home on a narrow hillside lane in western Kabul, the scene of some of the fiercest fighting.

7/21 - WP - Iranian-backed Shiite Muslims fired cannon & machine guns at rival Arab-backed factions for the 3rd straight day. At least 12 died & over 200 were wounded.

7/27 - NYT - According to Edward Gargan:

Iran, Saudi Arabia & Pakistan are jostling for influence in Kabul, indeed for a role as new big brother. A few weeks ago, without asking Kabul's Government, Iran opened a consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, in the north of the

country. The new Afghan Government, stunned by Iran's audacity, responded by surrounding the Iranian Embassy in Kabul with tanks demanding that the consulate be shut. It was.

7/28 - NYT - Iran appealed for an end to the fighting in Afghanistan & said it did not discriminate between the Sunni & Shiite warring factions. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Min. for Asian Affairs met with leaders of the Iranian-backed Hizb-I-Wahdat & Rabbani in Kabul. The Iranian said that "Iran does not uniquely give its support to Hizb-I-Wahdat."

7/29 - NYT - Afghan refugees returning home are being maimed by land mines at an alarming rate, according to the ICRC:

Since April, when Kabul fell to guerilla armies, the frequency of mine injuries - typically amputations - has tripled, according to records kept at three Red Cross hospitals, in Kabul and in Quetta and Peshawar, Pakistan. Mr. Boegli said the Red Cross was fitting about 300 artificial limbs a


month in Kabul and Peshawar, and there is a long waiting list. Despite education programs in refugee camps, children are often tempted to pick up certain kinds of mines, especially "butterflies," which are small and bright green. Their hands are blown off in the detonation.

8/9 - LAT - A rocket hit the presidential palace, killing 8 & injuring 12 in the fiercest fighting in Kabul since last April.

"I don't know what's going to happen in Kabul," Deputy Foreign Minister Hamid Karzai said. "We're just killing each other. It's senseless."

Government officials said the latest battle began after fighters loyal to Hezb-i-Wahadat, a coal-

ition of eight Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim groups, and Ittihad-i-Islami guerrillas, who are heavily financed by Saudi Arabia, argued over the exchange of prisoners who were seized in a battle last month.



The **MUSLIM** July 22, 1992

8/10 - NYT - In Kabul, the Gov't failed to negotiate a cease-fire. Shells hit the Red Cross hospital on Saturday, damaging the operating room.

- LAT - Rockets hit the Kabul TV station's antenna. Kabul TV could be off the air for as long as 10 months.

8/11 - WP - "Almost 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed or wounded since the rebels ousted the Communists, their common enemy. "At least half a dozen truces have been crafted since May. All have been broken & there is no indication a lasting peace is in sight."

Afghan Prime Minister Abdul Saboor Fareed arrived in Tehran and Iran's official Islamic Republic News Agency quoted him as telling reporters that he planned to persuade "Muslim friends" to urge Pakistan and Iran to exercise influence over the Afghan factions.

- LAT - UN Sec'y Gen'l Boutros-Ghali said that 2 UN staff members were killed in last Saturday's rocket attack.

8/12 - Newsday (Long Island) - The Kabul Gov't claimed to have pushed a rebel guerrilla group out of Kabul but rockets still rained on the city. The attacks forced Rabbani to cancel an official visit to Pakistan which was to have begun today.

8/14 - NYT - The UN Security Council demanded (on 8/12) that Russian Embassy personnel & other diplomats be allowed to leave Kabul. A Russian Embassy employee was killed 2 days ago when shells slammed into the Embassy compound.

But Mr. Hekmatyar said he would not permit departing officials to fly out of Kabul airport, according to the Afghan News Agency. He complained that his chief rival, Gen. Rashid Dostam, an Uzbek militia leader, was using the airport to reinforce his troops.

The news agency, which supports Mr. Hekmatyar, said he had called for a "strong and reliable force" to evacuate the envoys. But he said the diplomats would not be allowed to leave until the governing coalition freed all Hezb-i-Islami prisoners in Kabul.

The 1.5 million residents of Kabul are trapped meanwhile in their homes without electricity or water. United Nations officials warn that the lack of clean water could cause cholera or dysentery.

8/16 - NYT - Foreign diplomats met with Rabbani to discuss evacuating foreigners from Kabul. About 200 embassy workers are trying to leave the city; 2 Soviet Embassy staff members have been killed; the Kabul airport has been closed for 9 days because of fighting.

8/17 - LAT - UN agencies have sent most of their Kabul employees to Mazar-i-Sharif because of rocket attacks.

- About 20,000 Afghans, blocked earlier from leaving Kabul when the Gov't closed the eastern route out of the city, fled yesterday after the Gov't opened the road, headed for the eastern countryside & Pakistan.

8/18 - WP - Rabbani ruled out any return to the coalition Gov't for Gulbuddin. Rabbani said Gulbuddin gave up any right to membership in the 10-member ruling council when he launched his rocket bombardment on Kabul 10 days ago.

8/19 - WSJ - **Afghanistan's defense minister shifted thousands of guerrillas to Kabul to organize a counterattack against a renegade rebel chief who has besieged the capital. The fundamentalist rebel leader, Hekmatyar, renewed his rocket attacks on Kabul.**



Burhanuddin Rabbani

- LAT - Masoud & Rabbani rejected an offer by Gen. Dostam to fly in 10,000 of his Uzbeks from Mazar-i-Sharif.

8/20 - WSJ -

Afghan government forces launched a major offensive against rebels besieging Kabul, and guerrilla rockets later slammed into several hospitals and destroyed the city's main printing facility.

8/21 - NYT - Hezb-i-Islami guerrillas ambushed a convoy of 3,000 Uzbek militia men advancing along the Salang highway to reinforce Kabul. It was the last reported Hezb attack north of Kabul.

8/23 - LA Daily News - The Gov't & Hezb agreed to a temporary cease-fire to allow 250 diplomats & their families to leave Kabul. No date has been set for the one-day truce.

- Asbury Park Press -

Hekmatyar's fundamentalist fighters have dropped thousands of rockets on Kabul. Giant swaths of the city have been destroyed, and narrow blood-stained streets are littered with twisted metal and shattered glass.

Deputy Foreign Minister Hamid Karzai, who was among several dozen rebel leaders to march triumphantly into Kabul in April, said the subsequent bloodletting is a tragic end to the rebel's holy war. Cont. →

"We went into Kabul with a lot of glory and pride. Then began the unprecedented return of refugees and we were encouraged that our country would leap forward, gain strength and we would stand on our own feet," Karzai told The Associated Press in Islamabad.

8/24 - NYT - As the UN evacuated its foreign workers from Kabul, the Gov't asked it to turn Najibullah over to them.

- A senior UN official in Pakistan announced a special \$10m aid package to get medical supplies to Kabul hospitals & food to the nearly 100,000 people who have fled the city. The aid will be distributed from several provincial capitals in Afghanistan.

- LAT -

Deputy Foreign Minister Najibullah Lafraie said the government had told the United Nations it would protect former President Najibullah while fighting with the rebels continued. It delivered its request in writing to the U.N. office in Kabul.

"We will provide security for him until the situation in Kabul improves, and then he will stand trial according to international law," Lafraie told reporters.

Since April, only a handful of people have seen Najibullah, who shares a few rooms with a close aide and the aide's family.

U.N. officials had promised Najibullah safe passage out of Afghanistan in return for his promise to resign as president. As he tried to sneak out on a U.N.-chartered plane in April, however, he was stopped at Kabul airport by militiamen who had suddenly sided with the Islamic resistance.

8/25 - NYT - Diplomats flee:

France, Italy and Bulgaria closed their embassies and removed their remaining personnel a day after the United Nations withdrew its last three non-Afghan officials.

The diplomats, joined by several Polish and Indian officials, left by convey through the Hindu Kush mountains to the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. A French military plane is to pick them there, said Daniel Bernard, a French Foreign Ministry spokesman in Paris. The Bulgarian Ambassador, Valentin Gatsinko, who was in the convey, had suffered minor wounds in shelling on Sunday, and several people were reported wounded when the Pakistani and India embassies were hit. The main building of the United States Embassy, which is vacant, was also damaged.

8/25 - WSJ - Gulbuddin called for a holy war to deliver a final blow to the militia forces defending Kabul after France, Italy & Bulgaria closed their embassies there.

8/27 - NYT - Pakistan appealed for a 72-hour cease fire in Kabul.

The appeal from Pakistan came as Afghanistan's Vice President, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, and a delegation representing several factions prepared to set up a site for peace talks between rebels and the Government.

Mr. Mohammadi left the Pakistani border town of Peshawar, the rebels' former base, just after dawn to set up a headquarters about 30 miles east of Kabul. The delegates with him plan to open separate talks with President Burhanuddin Rabbani and with Gul-

buddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the dissident faction Hezb-i-Islami, on Thursday or Friday, an aide said. ...

Younis Khalis, leader of a neutral splinter faction, said Mr. Mohammadi's delegation was seeking a cease-fire and a reconciliation pact to establish a durable Islamic government. Mr. Khalis and Mr. Mohammadi are members of the Leadership Council, the uneasy coalition of 10 parties set up when the guerrillas took power.



8/29 - LAT & NYT - Thursday's temporary cease-fire fell apart after a rocket destroyed a Russian plane sent to evacuate diplomats from Kabul. Two other planes flew out with Russian, Indian, Chinese & Indonesian officials.

"Hezb-i-Islami were responsible for the attack," Afghan Foreign Minister Soleiman Gailani said. "I

don't know why, after they agreed yesterday to a cease-fire, they started shelling the airport."


8/30 - San Antonio Light - Pakistan closed its border with Afghanistan yesterday, stranding hundreds of Afghan refugees who had fled from Kabul.

8/31 - NYT - Reuters reported that the cease-fire was in effect long enough for Kabulis to fill the bazaars in an effort to stock up on food & other supplies.


One day after a cease-fire began, the bazaars in Kabul were filled with residents today who shouted their anger at the fighting expressed fears that the lull would be brief.

"They are just having the cease-fire to rearm themselves," said Fared Mohammad as he pulled a handcart loaded with blankets and pots and pans. "We have had these kinds of agreements 20 times before."

9/4 - WSJ - Flash floods killed over 450 people in the mountains north of Kabul; at least 500 are missing. Relief workers estimate that the death toll may reach 3,000. The LAT said a 33-foot-high wall of water swept through the area, a result of monsoon rains.



And meanwhile, in Peshawar, "the Commissioner reported 55,492 fresh arrivals (as of 8/31). Then they closed the border, but find it impossible to staunch the flow.... NWFP does not approve of the closure mainly because of the 'cream of Afghanistan,' for which read Khalqis & Parchamis, the darlings of Wali Khan & his party for years now." Much of the "cream" expects jobs to be found, "of which there are zilch."



"In 10 days schools are supposed to open but the US Gov't is honoring the directive of the 'legitimate Islamic Gov't' in Kabul calling for the closure of all refugee schools. They are supposed to move to Afghanistan - just how or with what resources is not mentioned." An emergency education task force is getting underway. "The emergency task force for NGO-UN cooperative relief to the displaced out of Kabul is organized & working well. Two camps set up in Jalalabad - relief commodity convoys at long last moving after having been blocked by the Gov't of Pakistan for reasons not entirely clear - something about creating shortages & high prices in Pakistan. There are so many stories".....

9/8 - Philadelphia Inquirer - The Kabul Gov't hanged 3 men yesterday in front of a crowd of thousands.

Defense Ministry spokesman Yunis Qanuni said the men - Sayed Saikander, Mohammad Gul and Mohammad Rafiq - had confessed to murder, looting and robbery before a special court to which there was no public access.

Their deaths were an example to others as the four-month-old mujaheddin government tried to restore order in the capital after weeks of bloody factional fighting, Qanuni said.

The hangings were said to be the first public execution in Kabul in two decades.

Armed men were stationed on overlooking buildings, and a marshal warned the 3,000 spectators of a possible attack to save the condemned. The men were working under the guise of different mujaheddin groups, Qanuni said.

The men were being executed "so people can feel safe and lead a normal life," an official told the crowd through a megaphone. "Let this be a lesson to others."

"Anybody who kills, loots, drinks alcohol, commits adultery or smokes hashish will be judged in accordance with Islamic law," said Abdul Majid Sultan, a judge of the court set up in May to impose strict Islamic law.

- Asbury Park Press reported that the men arrived in an armored personnel carrier, wearing bright orange ski masks & with their hands tied behind their backs with plastic bags.

9/9 - The birthday of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) was noted throughout the Muslim world. [Our thanks to Dr. Seraj for this information, Ed.]

Some gossip from a friend in Peshawar (dated September 3):

"There is thought here that the ceasefire (see chronology 8/27) was engineered by the ISI because Gulbuddin was about to be eliminated. Now he has time to regroup. "It is also said that Parcham is positioning itself for a come-back. Babrak is wandering around Kabul freely. All the top positions in Defense are Parcham, including the in-charge of hiring & firing. Khalqi military are totally excluded and are with Gulbuddin in order to survive; daily more & more are disenchanted but cannot join the Gov't because they are not welcome."



د پښتون دى
د سړى اور دى

"The Pashtun's enmity is like a smouldering fire."

Toward Peaceful Afghan Diversity

By BARNETT R. RUBIN

NEW YORK — Slightly more than two months after the proclamation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the country still exists; no ethnic group or region has seceded, and no one seems to be starving to death. The United Nations estimates that about 10,000 refugees per day are returning from Pakistan and Iran. No conflict has broken out outside the capital, Sigbanullah Mojaddidi has peacefully, if grudgingly, ceded the presidency to Burhanuddin Rabbani. These, at least, are the signs of hope.

But there have been repeated brushes with disaster, conflicts which have flared up and died down without being extinguished. The very existence of Afghanistan as a unified state is in question, its survival, and perhaps the peace of Southwest and Central Asia, depends on whether the new leadership can find a way to share power among its diverse claimants.

The demands of radical Islamic leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who belongs to the formerly dominant Pashtun ethnic group, have led to repeated fighting. Mr. Hekmatyar opposes the presence in Kabul of Uzbek militias who defected to the *mujahadeen* side only after the end of Soviet aid. He has repeatedly shelled the city. On July 6, however, two days after his shells had killed more than a hundred civilians, he agreed to allow one of his commanders, Ustad Abdul Saboor Fareed, to take office as prime minister.

In early June, fighting also broke out in Kabul between mainly Pashtun Sunni Muslim fighters supported by Arab groups and ethnic Hazara Shiite fighters supported by Iran. Each side seized hostages, some of whom seem to have been tortured before being released; others may have been killed. If any of these outbreaks spreads, it could devastate the entire region.

The Beginnings of the Great Game

Ironically, the modern state of Afghanistan owes its borders, perhaps even its existence, to an effort by 19th-century Russia and Britain to stabilize the region by creating a buffer between their empires. While most of today's Afghanistan had at some time been conquered by the Pashtun tribes that established the first Afghan empire, rulership had been intermittent and contested. To stabilize this territory, the British aided a dynasty to establish weak absolutist rule legitimized by Sunni Islam and Pashtun ethnic hegemony.

This project survived until the communist coup of April 1978. Fourteen years later, the Russian empire in Central Asia had dissolved, and along with it the centralized state projecting Pashtun hegemony over Afghanistan. What does it mean to be an "Afghan" with independent Uzbek and Tajik states to the north and a revolutionary Shiite Iran to the West, with every group well armed, and without a Pashtun-led government or army in Kabul?

For most Pashtuns, Afghanistan is Pashtun as Malaysia is Malay or Sri Lanka is Sinhalese—in each case, ethnic minorities can participate in governance but not rule. Yet today, Pashtuns, who dominate the refugee settlements in Pakistan, are a numerical minority inside the country, and the other ethnic groups are not willing to retreat to second-class status. And for the first time in history

there are independent Uzbek and Tajik states to whom they might look for support.

The coalition that took control of Kabul after the fall of Soviet-backed leader Gen. Najibullah in April had two main military components. One was the mainly Tajik forces led by Ahmad Shah Masoud, now defense minister. The second, and largest, was the former government Uzbek militia led by Abdul Rashid Dostum. In addition, Shiite forces took control of about a quarter of the city, lending force to their demand, backed by Iran, for at least a quarter of the positions in the new government.

Pashtuns are now a minority inside Afghanistan, and the other ethnic groups are not willing to retreat to second-class status. And for the first time in history there are independent Uzbek and Tajik states to whom they can look for support.

Mr. Hekmatyar voices his opposition to this coalition by denouncing Mr. Dostum as a communist. Many Pashtuns, however, understand his terms at least in part as code words directed against the domination of Kabul by non-Pashtuns. While most Pashtun resistance groups were poorly organized, Mr. Hekmatyar had used Pakistani and Arab aid to build a conventional military force of several thousand young men recruited from the Pakistani refugee camps.

Islam is also a source of division. The consolidation of Afghanistan as a Sunni state entailed the subjugation of the Hazaras and the near-proscription of Shiism. Some rulers allowed the Shiites more freedom, but now the latter demand not merely toleration but parity.

Can Afghanistan survive these conflicts?

One scenario is the breakup of Afghanistan on ethnic and regional lines. North Afghanistan would be divided between a Greater Uzbekistan and a Greater Tajikistan, the Shiites in the center would join together with the West, and the Pashtuns would be left with a rump state. This state might either join Pakistan or fragment it, pulling away the mainly Pashtun Northwest Frontier Province.

This scenario is unlikely. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Pakistan, which fragmented in this way, had administrative units based on ethnic identities. "Ethnic groups" did not declare their independence; republics or provinces did. Afghanistan does not have the equivalent territorial basis for separation. All the groups have focused their attention on Kabul, and none seem willing to give up a share of that prize.

The focus on Kabul could lead to another scenario. As in Beirut, armed ethnic and political militias could develop bases in different neighborhoods, creating a devastating urban civil war. The central state apparatus would have little influence over

warlords in the countryside, but the latter would prefer a weak Afghan state to integration into another country, where they might be subjugated or forced to curtail smuggling or opium growing.

The two scenarios could be combined. The Uzbek leader, Abdul Rashid Dostum, does have an embryonic territorial base in the north. He has demanded a decentralized federal system, and implicitly threatened to withdraw from Afghanistan. He controls the natural gas fields which provided half of the government's domestic revenue when Soviet experts were operating them (they are now capped). He has some support in Uzbekistan as well. The opposition leader Mohammad Saifullah has described the Uzbeks of Afghanistan as victims of a "century of Russian colonialism." Mr. Dostum could withdraw to the north while leaving Kabul to be fought over between Pashtun, Tajik and Hazara militias.

There is also a more peaceful scenario, in which Afghanistan would model itself somewhat on Switzerland. Not that Afghans will become plump bankers with a taste for chocolates and cuckoo clocks. But like the Swiss they could hold together their country of diverse mountain peoples by decentralizing power to units much smaller than ethnic territories. Afghanistan is already divided into group enclaves of them ethnically homogeneous and none of them covering the whole territory of an ethnic group. These are further divided into districts and subdistricts. As the rough equivalent of Swiss cantons, decision making would be devolved to this level, rather than either among ethnically defined larger territories or a strong central state.

Integration, Not Centralization

New communications technology can promote national integration without centralization. During the turnover of power in April, when the Soviet-backed government of Gen. Najibullah finally fell to the *mujahadeen*, commanders of all ethnic groups and regions negotiated directly via satellite telephones given to them by the U.S. These instantaneous communications were key to forestalling more serious conflicts and may yet help Afghanistan build national political networks without bringing all powerholders to Kabul.

It is always safer to predict the worst, but the disintegration of Afghanistan—whether by secession or civil war—is neither imminent nor inevitable. Its leaders have by and large called for reconciliation, not the pursuit of vendettas.

Afghanistan's new leaders deserve a chance to try to work out such a political system. So far, unfortunately, the international community has shown little support for these efforts. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have permitted extremist groups in their own societies to continue to aid Mr. Hekmatyar, while the West has hardly responded to the U.N. secretary-general's modest appeal for \$100 million to support the return of refugees and reconstruction. While no one can guarantee a successful effort to restabilize Afghanistan, the cost of trying is small compared to the cost of failing.

Mr. Rubin is associate professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Central Asia at Columbia University.

MASOUD MEETS AMBASSADORS

The Islamic Minister of the Defence State of Afghanistan, Honourable Ahmad Shah Masoud, had separate meetings in his office on Saratan 9 with His Excellency Ambassador Osman ambassador and extraordinary representative of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and His Excellency Juma Najib Mohammad Ismail ambassador of the State of Palestine in Kabul.

The sides exchanged views on various aspects of relations between their countries and some other issues of mutual interest. The ambassadors, representing their respective countries and their people, wished for further victories for the people of Afghanistan in their mission of reconstructing the Afghan homeland.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani Ambassador reaffirmed his country's assistance and contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

According to another report, defence minister Ahmad Shah Masoud had a meeting in his office with the charge d'affaires of embassy of the DPR of Korea in Kabul.

In this meeting, the Korean ambassador handed over the congratulatory message of the minister of armed forces of his country to esteemed Ahmad Shah Masoud, on the victory of the Revolution and establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the appointment of esteemed Masoud, as the defence minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

The sides also exchanged views on the amicable relations between the peoples and governments of the two countries. (BIA)

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ABBREVIATIONS USED

ACBAR - Agency Coordinating Bureau for Afghan Relief
AIG - Afghan Interim Government
BIA - Bakhtar Information Agency
CC - Central Committee
CSM - Christian Science Monitor
DYOA - Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany
GDR - German Democratic Republic
ICRC - Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT - Kabul Times
LAT - Los Angeles Times
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP - Northwest Frontier Province
NYT - New York Times
OIC - Organization of Islamic Conference
PCV - Peace Corps Volunteer
PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PT - Pakistan Times
PVO - Private Voluntary Organization
RC - Revolutionary Council
RA - Republic of Afghanistan
SCMP - South China Morning Post
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly
UNOCA - United Nations Office of the Commissioner
for Afghanistan
UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ - Wall Street Journal
WP - Washington Post

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the
Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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Mary Ann Siegfried
Editor & typist

Leonard Oppenheim
Treasurer &
proofreader

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